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ABSTRACT
The 'fair use" defense in copyright law shields an
intellectual commons of protected uses of copyrighted
material from infringement actions. In determining whether
a given use is fair, courts must assess the new use's
potential "effect on the market" for the copyrighted work.
Fair use jurisprudence too often fails to address the
complementary, network, and long-range effects of new
technologies on the value of copyrighted works. These
effects parallel the indirect, direct, and option values of
biodiversity recently recognized by environmental
economists. Their sophisticated methods for valuing natural
resources in tangible commons can inform legal efforts to
address the intellectual commons' "effect on the market"
for copyrighted works.
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I. INTRODUCTION: INTELLECTUAL AND TANGIBLE COMMONS
As new technology has enhanced the accessibility of copyrighted
materials,' Congress and the courts have changed and developed copyright
law repeatedly over the past decade. Recent copyright legislation has
generally strengthened the hand of owners of intellectual property rights
("IPRs").2 Court decisions have been more mixed, with some endorsing the
expansion of IPRs, and others refusing to recognize their holders' claims.
3
Responding to these developments, many leading IP scholars have
raised concerns about increasing commercialization of the intellectual
landscape. While their contributions are diverse, these critical IP scholars5
have begun to develop the "intellectual" or "creative" commons as a master
metaphor for the material they want to protect from perfect control by IPR
holders.
6
A commons is a resource "'in joint use or possession; to be held or
'See NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL (1995); GEORGE GILDER, TELECOSM: How
INFINITE BANDWIDTH WILL REVOLUTIONIZE OUR WORLD (2000); Charles Mann, The
Heavenly Jukebox, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2000, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2000/9/mann.htm.
2 In the 1990's, Congress has passed several pieces of copyright legislation designed to
expand the scope and force of copyrightholders' rights, privileges, and immunities. See,
e.g.,Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860 (1998) (adding sections 512 and 1201-05 to the Copyright Act of 1976), Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.A.), Digital Performance Right in
Sound Recordings Act (DPSRA) of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.A.), and Audio Home Recording
Act (AHRA) of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§1001-1010 (2000).
3 For a good historical overview, see William F. Fisher III, The Growth of Intellectual
Property: A History of the Ownership of Ideas in U.S. Law, available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iphistory.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2006).
4 James Boyle worries that the content industries' "preferred trifecta," "expansive
intellectual property rights, digital fences, and enforceable click-wrap licenses," could
effectively give IP owners perfect control over their works. Boyle, Cruel, Mean or Lavish?
Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 2007, 2020 (2000); cf Hannibal Travis, Pirates of the Information Infrastructure:
Blackstonian Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 777, 861
(2000).
5 For purposes of this paper, "critical IP scholars" include those who are generally skeptical
of the existing IPR regime and want to change it in order to expand access to copyrighted,
patented, and trademarked subject matter. More formally, such critical theorists aim at
enlightenment and emancipation of a public they deem too quiescent in the face of
expanding IP rights. See generally, RAYMOND GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A CRITICAL THEORY:
HABERMAS AND THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL (1981) (discussing the key components of
critical theories).
6 LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED
WORLD (2001); Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the
Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287 (1998).
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enjoyed equally by a number of persons."' 7 Classic examples of commons
are parks, roads, and beaches. 8  Critical copyright scholars argue that
software, music, and other intangible ideas share many qualities with these
public goods,9 such as non-rivalry in consumption, that make them ideal
"commons" resources.10  They argue that protection of a "creative
commons"' '1 from a "second enclosure movement"' 12 is essential to free
expression, economic competition, and equitable access to information.
Though most convincing as policy arguments for changing the law,
these concerns find formal legal expression in the extant copyright doctrine
of "fair use."'13 By guaranteeing individuals the right to make "fair uses" of
copyrighted material without gaining the permission of the copyrightholder,
the fair use doctrine enables the availability of a commons of intellectual
resources. However, the meaning of the doctrine is deeply unsettled in the
digital realm. This is largely because the statutory test for determining "fair
use" requires courts to equitably balance four factors, and the analysis often
turns on the fourth factor-the effect of the use on the potential market for
the copyrighted work. As section II below demonstrates, this "effect on the
market" analysis is often cursory and ad hoc, serving less to determine a
result than to rationalize foreordained conclusions.
7 LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 19 (2002) (quoting Oxford English
Dictionary); qf CAROL ROSE, The Comedy of the Commons, in PROPERTY AND
PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 105, 106
(1994) (noting that American "legal doctrine has strongly suggested that some kinds of
properties should not be held exclusively in private hands but instead should be open to the
public or at least subject to the ius publicum, to use the Roman law terminology the
'public right' [of use].").
8 For a fuller treatment of commons, see ROSE, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note
Error! Bookmark not defined., at I11.
9 Public goods are "goods whose consumption by one individual does not prevent their
consumption by other individuals"-in other words, their consumption is nonrivalrous.
DAVID COLANDER, MICROECONOMICS 117 (3d ed. 1998). Public goods are also often
nonexcludable; i.e., it is impossible to keep unauthorized users from using the property or
enjoying the benefits of the service. For example, it is difficult to deny the benefits of
national defense to tax scofflaws.
10 Douglas Noonan, Internet Decentralization, Feedback, and Self-Organization, in
MANAGING THE COMMONS 188 (John Baden & Douglas Noonan eds., 2d ed. 1998); James
Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net, 47 Duke L.J. 87
(1997).
I" See Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 55 FLA. L. REV. 763 (2003).
12 See James Boyle, The Public Domain: The Second Enclosure Movement and the
Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (Winter/Spring 2003).
13 Fair use originated as a judge-made doctrine, and is now codified in section 107 of the
Copyright Act of 1976. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). As an affirmative defense to a
copyright infringement suit, the fair use doctrine allows some use of copyrighted works
without the permission of the copyright holder. See id. Fair use is a case-by-case, fact-
dependent issue, determined by a four-part balancing test established in § 107. For
historical background on "fair use," see WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN
COPYRIGHT LAW (1995).
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Responding to decisions restricting fair use, critical IP scholars have
developed innovative First Amendment-based arguments for extending it in
the digital realm. 14  Some have also proposed legislative and regulatory
schemes to protect an intellectual commons. 15 While acknowledging the
value of these approaches, this article proposes a different route: informing
"fourth factor" (or "effect on the market") analysis with economic
assessments drawn from efforts to value physical, real-space commons.16
Environmental economists have developed sophisticated methods of
measuring the value of commons in natural resources. Application of the
techniques and concepts developed in environmental economics to "effect
on the market" analysis in fair use cases would enable courts to recognize
the Pareto-optimal features of an intellectual commons which restrictions on
fair use threaten.
In the next part of this article, I examine "effect on the market"
analysis in several cases responding to new technologies of copying (Part
II). The article examines both pro- and anti-fair use cases in each of three
broad categories of fair use disputes: consumptive use, technical
compatibility, and transformative use. 17 In each category, two cases are
contrasted.
Part III advances the claim that featured cases affirming fair use
evince a stronger understanding of information economics than the anti-fair
use cases with similar fact patterns. Both Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.18 and Sega v. Accolade19 take seriously the
prevalence of complementarity in the information economy-i.e., the ways
in which market competitors may ultimately thrive off one another's
success. For example, it turned out that VCR's not only created substitutes
(i.e., home videotapes) for programs marketed by copyright holders, but
14 See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints
on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354 (1999).
15 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Copyright
Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41 (2001).
16 1 draw some inspiration from recent efforts to model the transmission of ideas (via
memes) on the transmission of DNA (via genes). See JACK BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE
(1998) (extensively exploring the similarities and differences between social reproduction
of culture, mechanical reproduction of data and biological reproduction of organisms);
STEPHEN WOLFRAM, A NEW KIND OF SCIENCE (2002) (discussing analogies between the
operation of mechanical, computational and natural systems). Just as the dynamics of
computer programs can help us understand the natural world, the dynamics of the natural
world can help us understand our information ecology.
1 This classification is based on the presentation of materials in a leading casebook. See
JULIE COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 496 (2002).
Cohen, Loren, Okedji, and O'Rourke classify three broad types of fair use cases: cultural
interchange, consumptive use, and technical use. I have referred to the "cultural
interchange" category here as "transformative use," because it captures some cases that
feature copyrighted expression that is not necessarily a cultural object.
" 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
19 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993).
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also strongly complemented that market by creating the infrastructure
necessary for the rise of video rental stores. 20 The majority opinion in Kelly
v. Arriba Soft Corp.21 appreciated the economics of experience goods-i.e.,
those goods that usually must be experienced before an informed purchase
can be made-to a much greater extent than the rival Video Pipeline, Inc. v.
Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc.22 decision. Kelly's website provided
important advertising and publicity for the images it collected, permitting
the kind of previewing and browsing that has been documented as essential
to successful marketing strategies in the internet age.
If all this a true, a skeptical reader might press, why aren't all courts
recognizing the complementarities, network effects, and experience good
effects of unauthorized uses? Admittedly, the complementarities evident in
cases like Sony and Kelly will not always approach the magnitude of the
substitutional effect of new uses of copyrighted work. For example,
regardless of how much the centralized file-sharing system in Napster
advertised music via the "hotlists" prevalent on the P2P network, that effect
was not likely to outweigh the substitutive effect of free MP3's.23 Yet a
judgment of magnitude like that evident in Napster depends on an
antecedent valuation of the positive effects of unauthorized use.
Environmental economics can be very helpful in correcting judicial biases
against acknowledging the full weight of complementarities, network
effects, and experience good effects.
Courts tend to discount these effects because of their restricted time
horizons and their inexperience with nonmarket valuation. In order to get a
fuller sense of the value of an intellectual commons protected by fair use,
2 4
litigants should examine the type of abstract, generalizable valuation of
environmental commons pioneered by economists studying biodiversity
(Part III). Environmental approaches to valuation focus on three key factors
ignored by conventional economic analysis: 1) the long-term impact of
privatizing a commons resources, 2) the diffuse benefits of commons
resources, and 3) the "ecosystem services" provided by undeveloped land.
By employing methods like hedonic pricing and contingency valuation,
environmental economists have put monetary value on the positive effects
20 See Brett Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917 (2005); Lawrence Lessig, Reply: Re-Marking the
Progress in Frischmann, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1031 (2005).
21 77 F.Supp.2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
22 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003).
23 See, e.g., Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effects of File-Sharing on Record
Sales: An Empirical Analysis (Mar. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The
University of North Carolina), available at
http://www.unc.edu/-cigar/papers/FileSharing March2004.pdf.
24 Given the doctrinal focus on the effects on the market for the plaintiff's work, this paper
focuses on the value of the new use to the copyrightholder; however, many of the points
apply afortiori to the value of the use to society at large.
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of conservation.
The following chart suggests the match between the problems
suffered by "effect on the market" analysis and the solutions offered by
biodiversity valuation:
Shortcoming of Complementary
"Effect on the Achievement of
Market" Analysis in Scholarship in Biodiversity
Fair Use Valuation
Time Horizon Too often Sets "option" and
undervalues long-term "bequest" values on
Pareto-optimal or biodiversity as raw material
Kaldor-Hicks optimal for future exploitation.
impact of disruptive Valuation via contingency
technologies, and hedonic pricing methods.
Complementary Unwilling to Inquires into the value of
Products systematically explore "wilderness" complementing
benefits to content adjoining, developed land.
owners of products Explores the full range of
which complement uses for ecosystems, and
their work and thus their diffuse benefits.
increase the value of
paid uses.
Network Effects Ignores how a network Examines the role of
of fair uses may make ecosystems in enabling other
parallel paid uses productive economic
more likely, activity.
Over the past thirty years, environmentalists have shifted from
emphasizing the "pricelessness" of common environmental resources to
quantitatively analyzing the price we pay for their neglect. Would-be
protectors of a commons of ideas could benefit from a similar shift in
rhetoric. Given its growing impact on policy, economic analysis is certain
to play an increasingly important role in intellectual property law. New
valuation techniques that capture hitherto under-recognized values of fair
use can enrich this economic analysis.
II. ASSESSING THE EFFECT OF UNAUTHORIZED USE ON THE VALUE OF
THE COPYRIGHTED WORK
Empowered by the Constitution to "promote the progress of science
and useful arts" 25 by giving exclusive rights of ownership over intellectual
25 Article 1, Section 8, of the Constitution provides that "The Congress shall have power...
[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
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property, Congress has passed several laws protecting copyrights in
literature, music, software, and much other subject matter. Courts have
limited the protection of copyright to particular expressions of ideas, and
not to ideas themselves. Courts have also refused to find infringement
where the defendant made "fair use" of a work.26  In the 1976 Copyright
Act, Congress codified this "fair use" exception as the first of fourteen
statutory limits on the powers of copyrightholders:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A
[enumerating copyrightholders' rights], the fair use of a
copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright. In
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include --
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.2
As technologies of copying have exponentially increased in availability and
effectiveness, 28 so too have the number and diversity of fair use defenses to
copyright infringement actions.
29
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 8. "The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of
authors, but '[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."' Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (quoting U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl.
8).
26 WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW (2nd ed., 1995). The
term "fair use" originate in Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No.
8136). For a historical look at "fair use," see generally CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT
LAW 722-23 (1998); Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair
Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1,4 (1997).
27 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
28 Richard P. Adelstein & Steven 1. Peretz, The Competition of Technologies in Markets for
Ideas: Copyright and Fair Use in Evolutionary Perspective, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 209,
223 (1985) (noting that it took approximately one man-year to copy a book on paper in
1000 A.D., but took less than an hour to photocopy the same in the late twentieth century).
29 The classic fair use case involved abridgment of or commentary on literary works. I
classify such commentaries, as well as more modern appropriations and arrangements of
copyrighted works, as transformative uses, and examine two representative cases in Section
C below. Another category of fair use cases has arisen with the spread of new technologies
of copying. I classify this category as "consumptive," since it largely involves copying vel
non of existing work. This category is explored in Section A below. Finally, given the
copyrightability of software, a new line of cases has arisen involving the right to make one
or a few copies of a competitor's software in order to repair hardware running the software
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Recognizing the emptiness of the second and third factors,30 and the
manipulability of the first, 31 the Supreme Court and several appellate courts
have focused on the fourth factor in fair use cases. 32 The factor's prescribed
"effect on the market analysis" has assumed great importance: It was called
"undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use" in the landmark
Harper & Row decision, and has been critical to the holding in several
cases. As the Nimmer treatise states, "Fair use, when properly applied, is
limited to copying by others which does not materially impair the
marketability of the work which is copied.,
33
Like fair use doctrine generally, "effect on the market" analysis is in
flux. There are a few fixed guideposts: Clearly commercial uses are
suspect, and "transformative" or "productive" uses are treated more
or to develop similar software or hardware. Classed as "technical interoperability" cases,
these are discussed in Section B below.
30 Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 522 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Factors (1) and (2) are
empty, except that (1) suggests a preference for noncommercial educational uses, picking
up the reference earlier in the statute to 'teaching ... scholarship or research.' Factor (3) is
inapplicable to Beanie Babies, each one of which is copyrighted separately, so that there
can be no partial copying as a matter of fact (no one, we imagine, wants a photograph of
part of a Beanie Baby)."). Ironically, to the degree that the home tapers copied the entire
work and watched all of it (including the ads, in the manner the plaintiffs hoped they
would), that may well have counted against them in the third factor inquiry (the amount
and substantiality of the use).
31 The key determinations in the first factor are commerciality (which goes to the purpose
of the use) and transformativeness (which goes to the character of the use). Definitions of
commerciality are notoriously divergent. Compare A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (characterizing private copying as commercial) with Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (characterizing such
copying as noncommercial). The vanishingly thin line between parody and satire, valiantly
maintained in the Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), decision, is a
classic example of the degree of judicial discretion permitted in the "transformativeness"
determination.
32 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 13.05 [A] [4] (2003) ("If one looks to the fair use cases, if not always to their
stated rationale, this emerges as the most important, and indeed, central fair use factor.").
But see the Second Circuit's rejection of this idea:
Prior to Campbell, the Supreme Court had characterized the fourth
factor as 'the single most important element of fair use.' However,
Campbell's discussion of the fourth factor conspicuously omits this
phrasing. Apparently abandoning the idea that any factor enjoys
primacy, Campbell instructs that '[a]ill [four factors] are to be explored,
and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.'
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 926 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Campbell, at 574) (citations omitted). The Nimmer treatise continues to advance the
effective primacy of the fourth factor, via its proposed "functional test" for fair use.
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][4] (2003).
33 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.10[D], at 1-87; see also 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
13.05[A], at 13-76 (collecting cases).
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favorably than mere copying. 34 Courts must keep in mind not only the case
at hand, but also its potential ramifications: A use is not fair if "it would
adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work" should it
"become widespread., 35 The assessment is rife with hypotheticals: The
court has to assess effect on the potential market for the work and for
derivative works, if the examined use were to become widespread.
Assessing the effect of an allegedly infringing use or derivative
work on the value of a copyrighted work is a difficult task. Users of
virtually every new technology of copying and distribution that has
emerged since the 1976 Act have advanced fair use defenses; only rarely
have the courts consistently affirmed or proscribed a use. A brief
exploration of leading lines of cases dealing with new technologies and fair
use reveals that the economic analysis deployed to assess "marketability" is
too-often cursory, partial, and uninformed by the latest in information
economics. However, more complete analysis-most evident in the historic
Sony majority and dissent, and also in recent Ninth Circuit decisions on
software decompilation and image search engines-points the way to more
rigorous "effect on the market" analyses.
Each of the sections below considers cases where rather similar
activities are given radically different "fair use" treatment. In each
situation, the court's analysis of the economic effect of the unauthorized use
proved decisive. In pro-fair use cases, judicial acknowledgment of the
positive effects of unauthorized use on the value of the plaintiffs work
contributed significantly to a fair use finding. In the anti-fair use cases, a
refusal to credit positive effects led to an unambiguous finding of market
substitution and a negative fair use finding. While remaining agnostic as to
the results in these cases, this article demonstrates that the economic
methods either explicitly embraced or adumbrated in the pro-fair use cases
are far superior to those evident in the parallel anti-fair use cases explored
here. As Parts III and IV show, the economic approach of the pro-fair use
cases is not merely idiosyncratic to the fact situations presented by the
VCR, internet search engines, or video game software, but is generalizable
to a wide range of cases.
A. CONSUMPTIVE USES: DIRECT COPYING IN SONY AND PRINCETON
UNIV. PRESS
34 "If the intended use is for commercial gain, [the] likelihood [of market harm] may be
presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated."
Sony, 464 U.S. at 451. However, "[n]o 'presumption' or inference of market harm that
might find support in Sony is applicable to a case involving something beyond mere
duplication for commercial purposes." Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 (giving the benefit of the
doubt to "productive" or "transformative" uses).
" Sony, 464 U.S. at 451 (arguing that the more transformative the use, the less the "effect
on the market" analysis matters).
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Of all the purposes of the fair use doctrine, perhaps the most
sacrosanct is the "educational use" exemption. 36  Congress has shown
special solicitude toward the plight of the student and researcher attempting
to acquire knowledge. However, a leading case from the Sixth Circuit now
prohibits professors there from assembling readings into coursepacks
without getting licenses from the relevant copyrightholders. Despite the
Supreme Court's affirmation of the fairness of private copying of entire
television programs in Sony v. Universal, the Sixth Circuit insisted that the
copying of parts of materials with far greater educational value was not a
fair use. The courts' very different understandings of the economics of
unauthorized use are essential to the divergent findings.
1. Photocopying of Printed Works
In the mid-1970s, technological advances in the mechanical
reproduction of printed documents gave an unprecedented number of
individuals and institutions the opportunity to copy articles and even books.
Several institutions took advantage of the new technology in order to reduce
their number of subscriptions to expensive, specialized journals.3 7 In 1974,
the Williams & Wilkins Co., publishers of medical research journals, sued
the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and its affiliated National Library of
Medicine (NLM) for their practice of copying and distributing articles to
staff members. 38  The NIH didn't copy journals wholesale-it limited
copying to 50 pages per article, one article per journal, and one copy per
request. Nevertheless, its copying was substantial, 39 and Williams &
36 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
37 The debate continues to this day. The Wellcome Trust in England recently "argued that
the present market structure in journal publishing does not work to the advantage of
scientists [in part because] . . . publishers have raised their prices during the past decade
well above inflation." Editorial, 21st-century Biomedical Journals: Failures and Futures,
362 LANCET 9395 (2003) (citing THE WELLCOME TRUST, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PUBLISHING (2003)); cf. Paul A. David, A Tragedy of the Public
Knowledge "Commons"? Global Science, Intellectual Property and the Digital Technology
Boomerang (SIEPR Discussion Paper no. 00-02, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy
Research, 2000), available at http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/00-02.html (last visited
Apr. 18, 2006); Amanda Schaffer, Open Access: Should Scientific Articles Be Available
Online and Free to the Public?, SLATE, Dec. 16, 2004, http://slate.msn.com/id/2111023;
Rick Weiss, A Fight for Free Access to Medical Research Online Plan Challenges
Publishers' Dominance, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2003, at Al, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A19104-2003Aug4?Language-printer;
Samuel E. Trosow, Copyright Protection for Federally Funded Research: Necessary
Incentive or Double Subsidy?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 613 (2004).
31 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an
equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
39 The panel concedes that NLM in particular provided interlibrary loans not only to other
public agencies but also to private sector scientists:
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Wilkins argued that the substitution of library copies for purchased
subscriptions threatened the viability of several journals.
Decided before the 1976 Copyright Act became effective, Williams
& Wilkins was based on the extant "federal common law" of fair use
doctrines.40 In ruling in favor of the federal medical research agencies, the
court found that "there is inadequate reason to believe, that [the plaintiff] is
being or will be harmed substantially by these specific practices of NIH and
NLM." 41 The defendant's expert had provided a comprehensive study of
the effect of photocopying on the medical journal industry. 42  Plaintiff
responded to this report with anecdotal evidence of subscriptions cancelled
due to researchers' substitution of photocopies of desired articles for the
journals from which they came. The court rejected this as a just-so story,
but also proposed several of its own:
If photocopying were forbidden, the researchers, instead of
In 1968, a representative year, NLM received about 127,000 requests for
interlibrary loans. Requests were received, for the most part, from other libraries
or Government agencies. However, about 12 percent of the requests came from
private or commercial organizations, particularly drug companies. Some requests
were for books, in which event the book itself was loaned. Most requests were for
journals or journal articles; and about 120,000 of the requests were filled by
photocopying single articles from journals, including plaintiffs journals. Usually,
the library seeking an interlibrary loan from NLM did so at the request of one of
its patrons. If the "loan" was made by photocopy, the photocopy was given to the
patron who was free to dispose of it as he wished. NLM made no effort to find out
the ultimate use to which the photocopies were put; and there is no evidence that
borrowing libraries kept the "loan" photocopies in their permanent collections for
use by other patrons
Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1349.
40 Williams & Wilkins is still relevant because Congress meant § 107 (effective Jan. 1,
1978) "to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge
it in any way." H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-473 (1975).
41 Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1354. The court also found "that medicine and medical
research will be injured by holding these particular practices to be an infringement" and
"since the problem of accommodating the interests of science with those of the publishers
(and authors) calls fundamentally for legislative solution or guidance, which has not yet
been given, we should not, during the period before congressional action is forthcoming,
place such a risk of harm upon science and medicine." Id.
42 The panel was skeptical about the publishers' claims of poverty. It observed that
"between 1958 and 1969 annual subscriptions to the four medical journals involved
increased substantially (for three of them, very much so), annual subscription sales likewise
increased substantially, and total annual income also grew," and that "plaintiffs business
appears to have been growing faster than the gross national product or of the rate of growth
of manpower working in the field of science." Id, at 1357. The "rate of growth" point is a
fascinating nod in the direction of "reasonable rate of return" regulation for intellectual
property under compulsory licensing/liability rules. For a fuller discussion of compulsory
licensing, see Matthew Fagin et al., Beyond Napster: Using Antirust Law to Advance and
Enhance Online Music Distribution, 8 B.U. J. SCi. & TECH. L. 451, 523 (2002).
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subscribing to more journals or trying to obtain or buy back-
issues or reprints (usually unavailable), might expend extra
time in note-taking or waiting their turn for the library's
copies of the original issues -- or they might very well cut
down their reading and do without much of the information
they now get through NLM's and NIH's copying system... In
the absence of photocopying, the financial, time-wasting, and
other difficulties of obtaining the material could well lead, if
human experience is a guide, to a simple but drastic reduction
in the use of the many articles (now sought and read) which
are not absolutely crucial to the individual's work but are
merely stimulating or helpful.
43
In the absence of concrete proof of the detriment of copying to the
copyright-holders, the court was loathe to permit them to veto NIH's use of
the works.
Twenty years later, in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.,
the Second Circuit reached a very different result in a very similar case
(over a dissent which reprised the reasoning of Williams & Wilkins).44 The
American Geophysical Union (AGU), along with 82 other publishers of
scientific and technical journals, sued Texaco for permitting its researchers
to copy and distribute articles from their publications. 45 The court ruled that
"such institutional, systematic copying" did not constitute fair use under §
107 of the Copyright Act. 46  Though the court rejected Harper's
characterization of the "effect on the market" factor of fair use analysis as
the "single most important element" of the fair use analysis, its treatment of
the factor was pivotal to the outcome of the case.47
The court in AGU observed that two markets existed for the articles
and journals at issue: "a traditional market for, and hence a clearly defined
value of, journal issues and volumes," and another, untraditional market for
"individual journal articles" which (as yet) had not generated any "clearly
43 Williams & Wilkins, 420 U.S. at 1358.
44 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995).4 1Id. at 915.
46 Id. at 932. The differing results may have something to do with the ultimate purposes of
the use in question N l focused on medical research with obvious public significance,
whereas Texaco presumably focused on narrow commercial endeavors. Sensitive to the
problem of the non-representative litigant, William Fisher proposed that courts consider
"the universe of activities vis-a-vis" the copyrighted work when deciding individual fair
use cases. William Fisher, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1661, 1706 (1988). As the NIH/Texaco divide shows, courts would also do well to
consider the universe of purposes to which the contested use could be put. One may
criticize Fisher for the impracticality of his proposal. However, it would represent a step
toward the consideration of long-term beneficial effects I think necessary to fair use
analysis, and the speculative nature of potential uses could be discounted by an appropriate
formula reflecting the relative (un)likelihood of their development.
47 AGU, 60 F.3d at 930-31.
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defined value" for individual articles.48  Endorsing the district court's
agnosticism on the matter, a majority of the panel held that even widespread
adoption of Texaco-type copying would not necessarily harm the
marketability of "additional journal subscriptions, back issues, and back
volume" in the traditional market for these materials. 49 However, in the
twenty years between Williams & Wilkins, a number of new markets for
individual articles had arisen, including authorized document distributors
and the Copyright Clearance Center. 50 Based on these decisions, the
appellate panel concluded that
if Texaco's unauthorized photocopying was not permitted as fair
use, the publishers' revenues would increase significantly since
Texaco would (1) obtain articles from document delivery
services (which pay royalties to publishers for the right to
photocopy articles), (2) negotiate photocopying licenses directly
with individual publishers, and/or (3) acquire some form of
photocopying license from the Copyright Clearance Center Inc.( "C  C "v).51
Concluding that "the right to seek payment for a particular use tends to
become legally cognizable under the fourth fair use factor when the means
for paying for such a use is made easier," the majority held that Texaco's
copying was not a fair use.
52
It's hard not to see the circularity here: the Copyright Clearance
Center allegedly makes licensing schemes viable, but is itself only a
plausible enterprise if courts require licenses for the services it offers (by
negating fair use defenses).53 The dissent takes the majority to task for
assuming the existence of a viable market for individual articles, noting that
"individual publishers remain free to stand upon the rights conferred in this
Court's opinion, and negotiate separate licenses with separate terms, or sell
48 Id.
49 "[T]he evidence concerning sales of additional journal subscriptions, back issues, and
back volumes does not strongly support either side with regard to the fourth factor." Id. at
929. Cf Sony, 464 U.S. at 451-55 (rejecting various predictions of harm to value of
copyrighted work based on speculation about possible consequences of secondary use).
50 "Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., the largest licenser of text reproduction rights in the
world, was formed in 1978 to facilitate compliance with U.S. copyright law. . . .The
company currently manages rights relating to over 1.75 million works and represents more
than 9,600 publishers and hundreds of thousands of authors and other creators, directly or
through their representatives." Copyright Clearance Center, Corporate Overview,
http://www.copyright.com/ccc/do/viewPage?pageCode-aul (last visited Apr. 12, 2006).
51AGU, 60 F.3d at 930-31 (citing 802 F. Supp. 1, 19 (the district court opinion)).
52 Id.
53 In Lydia Loren's words, "The argument that 'lost' permission fees are proof of fourth
factor harm has as its premise the legal conclusion at issue: that the use at issue is not a fair
use and, therefore, the owner is allowed to charge permission fees for such use." Lydia
Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach, supra note 26, at 5.
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offprints and refuse any license at all."5 4 Calling the market for licensing
"cumbersome and unrealized," the dissent would have called Texaco's use
fair.5
5
The Sixth Circuit divided over the same issue in an en banc ruling
three years after AGU. In Princeton University Press v. Michigan
Document Services, Inc., the majority held that a duplicator of
"coursepacks" containing excerpts from books assigned in college classes
was liable for infringement.5 6 The majority stated that the plaintiffs "need
only show that if the challenged use 'should become widespread, it would
adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work. '
57
Admitting that virtually any copyrightholder could deem a hitherto fair use
a means of denying the owner potential revenues from the work, the
majority limited its holding on the fourth factor to consideration of effects
on "'traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets."5 8  Of
course, the likelihood of development of such markets is endogenous to the
very decision supposedly determined by it.
The majority directly addressed this circular reasoning by claiming
that nearly any copyright claim assumes the copyrightholder's right to
revenues from the infringed work. 59 This conceptual legerdemain did not
impress the dissenters. As Judge Ryan complained, the majority's
treatment of "potential" markets for the articles in question was
underspecified:
[T]he publishers do not claim that they sought to publish
compilations or anthologies but were thwarted by the existence
of the coursepacks. There is no evidence that the publishers are
interested in or capable of customizing their copyrighted works
to accommodate the specific, limited, and frequently updated
requests of individual professors. There is no evidence even that
54 AGU, 60 F.3d at 937 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
55 Id
56 Princeton, 99 F.3d 1381 (1997).
57 Id. at 1396 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985) (quoting Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984))).
58 Princeton, 99 F.3d at 1407 (quoting Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d
913, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. dismissed, 516 U.S. 1021 (1995)).
59 Here is the Princeton majority's response to the "circularity" point:
[i]magine that the defendants set up a printing press and made exact
reproductions -- asserting that such reproductions constituted "fair use"
-- of a book to which they did not hold the copyright. Under the
defendants' logic it would be circular for the copyright holder to argue
market harm because of lost copyright revenues, since this would
assume that the copyright holder had a right to such revenues.
Princeton, 99 F.3d at 1387. It is difficult to see how the self-evidence of infringement in
this hypothetical demonstrates the same in the much closer case before the court in
Princeton particularly given Congress's specific imprimatur upon "multiple copies for
classroom use." 16 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
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the publishers seek to license the compilation of excerpts by a
third party who is equipped to assemble the compilations but
refuses to do so without an agreement that the publishers grant it
exclusive rights to publish the excerpts. Thus, there is no
evidence that the value of the copyrighted works in a potential
market was harmed in any way by the production of the
60coursepacks challenged in this case.
Judge Martin's dissent also questioned the publishers' right to set the
precise terms of use of their works via "effect on the market" analysis:
[T]he publishers would prefer that students purchase the
publications containing the excerpts instead of receiving
photocopies of excerpts from the publications. . . . What the
publishers would "prefer" is not part of the analysis to determine
the effect on the potential market .... The facts demonstrate that
it is only wishful thinking on the part of the publishers that the
professors who assigned the works in question would have
directed their students to purchase the entire work if the
excerpted portions were unavailable for copying .... [I]t seems
more likely that they would have omitted the work altogether
instead of requiring the students to purchase the entire work.6
The Martin dissent rightly implies that publishers ought not to be able to
dictate extremely restrictive terms for the use of printed materials-
particularly in the educational context. But neither dissent fully recognizes
that copyrightholders may only be able to develop low-cost licensing via
collective rights societies if they have the power to prevent unauthorized
62
use.
Neither the majority nor dissenting opinions in AGU and Princeton
squarely confront the consequences of their position. In place of systematic
analysis of the results of restricting or denying fair use, they tend to assume
that which needed to be proved (a potentially viable copyright clearance
market, in the case of the majority, or the implausibility of such a market, in
the case of the dissent). The majority opinions also omit entirely the great
(if diffuse) benefits to publishers afforded by a robust regime of fair use-
such as effective "advertising" of the journals in question, more prestigious
editorial boards hoping to reach a wider audience, and more willing
submissions from authors motivated primarily by the hope of reaching a
broad audience (as opposed to gaining a profit). The Supreme Court's
60 Princeton, 99 F.3d at 1396 (Martin, J., dissenting).
61 Id.6lid
62 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1293 (1996) (advocating
property rules as incentives for the creation of CROs that are more capable than courts at
valuing intellectual property).
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decision in Sony v. Universal Studios provides some clues on how courts
can better incorporate these factors into fair use determinations.
63
2. Home Videotaping
In 1986 the Supreme Court decided that noncommercial taping of
television programs was a "fair use" of such programs. In the course of
describing the "substantial noninfringing uses" of the videocassette recorder
(VCR), the Court held "unauthorized time shifting" (i.e., a viewer's taping a
program in order to watch it later than its original broadcast) was a "fair
use" of the program under § 107 of the Copyright Act.64  The decision
rested in large part on the court's recognition that the VCR not only created
tapes that substituted for the plaintiffs' work, but also complemented that
work in many ways.
The plaintiffs had claimed that "'consumptive uses of copyrights by
home VTR users [substitute for their works because a] consumer ... will
not buy tapes separately sold by the copyrightholder"' if they are able to
make tapes at home. 65  The plaintiffs also claimed that the VCR would
decimate advertising revenue because users would simply fast-forward
commercials. The plaintiffs would have had the court enjoin the sale of
VCRs altogether, or, failing that, force defendants to remove the "record"
and "fast forward" buttons from the machine.
66
Aided by the district court's comprehensive inquiry into the effects
of VCRs, the Sony majority was able to examine a wide range of effects of
the new technology, and took into account its potential benefits for the
63 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
64 Id. at 417. Addressing the first factor, the majority found that while the character of the
use (mere copying) was nontransformative (a strike against fair use), the purpose of the use
was noncommercial, and therefore the first factor militated in favor of the copiers. The
majority essentially ignored the second and third factors, asserting without argument that
they did not weigh against time-shifting even though normally one might expect that each
would. The majority reserved its most comprehensive analysis for its discussion of the
fourth fair use factor, "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work." Given that the use at issue was noncommercial, the burden was on the
plaintiffs to demonstrate that home videotaping impaired the marketability of their work.
65Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong.,
1250 (1982) (memorandum of Prof. Laurence H. Tribe). Virtually the same argument was
accepted by the Napster court, which characterized private copying in that case as
commercial because it substituted for purchase of the materials. A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). Since a copyrightholder will always license
material at some price, such a broad interpretation of commerciality would of course render
nearly every putative fair use commercial.
66 See JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: A MACHINE AND THE COMMOTION IT CAUSED
(1987); Randal C. Picker, Rewinding Sony: The Evolving Product, Phoning Home and the
Duty of Ongoing Design, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 749 (2005).
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complaining copyrightholders. Citing the district court's summary of its
fair use finding, the majority explained:
The audience benefits from the time-shifting capability have
already been discussed. It is not implausible that benefits could
also accrue to plaintiffs, broadcasters, and advertisers, as the
Betamax makes it possible for more persons to view their
broadcasts.67
We might classify the potential effects of VTR usage on live TV and theater
viewing as either substitutional or complementary. To the extent the
plaintiffs' predictions of reduced viewership held true, the VTR would be a
substitute for live viewership. However, to the extent that VTRs
encouraged viewers to become more dedicated to certain programs or stars,
or whetted their appetite for audiovisual works generally, VTRs would
complement live viewership. Demand for VTR-recorded material would
then "spill-over" into demand for more live material, instead of
"compensating" for its lack.68
Explicit recognition of these rival effects marked an important
advance in the law of fair use. The majority explicitly acknowledges the
very real possibility of lost viewers and advertising dollars for the plaintiffs,
but it also factored in the potential benefits of widespread VCR distribution,
and presciently concluded that these new opportunities would swamp its
negative effects. 69  The Sony majority recognized that "effect on the
market" analysis should not end with a determination that a contested use
would potentially have negative effects on a potential market for
copyrighted work. Potential positive effects are relevant as well.7 °
The Sony dissent criticized the majority by comparing the
individualistic, personal "use" of copyrighted materials via VCR recording
to classic fair uses, including those "listed in [§] 107 itself ... [such as]
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, . . . scholarship, or
research., 71 The dissent deems these uses "productive," as opposed to the
"ordinary" use of delayed viewing of television programs, and states that in
"no case in [has] the reproduction of a copyrighted work for the sole benefit
of the user has been held to be fair use." 72  Though unavailing, this
argument too hints at a more sophisticated economic analysis of the market
17 Sony, 464 U.S. at 454.
" Jon Elster's delineation of "compensation" and "spill-over" effects is less economistic
than the average substitute/complement analysis, and is particularly helpful in analyzing
"creative industries." See JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 45
(1989).
'9 Sony, 464 U.S. at 454.70 d.
71 Id. at 485 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 479.
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effects of a fair use finding. "Productive" uses are protected in part because
they can complement, and not merely compete with, the copyrighted work.
3. Superior Legal and Economic Analysis in Sony
It is easy to reconcile the cases on the basis of the location of the
copying. The copying in Sony happened within homes, whereas the Texaco
and Princeton University Press cases involved copying within a business.
However, this distinction is not as important to the ultimate resolution of the
cases as it might appear on first blush. Given the prevalence of physical
and digital copying equipment, it is easy to imagine the activities in the
photocopying cases occurring within the comfort of the defendants' homes.
It is doubtful that this would make much difference to the analysis of the
cases.
More important to the divergent outcomes is the cases' style of
economic analysis. Texaco and Princeton University Press idealize a world
in which every use that can be paid for is paid for. They do not even
acknowledge the positive effects of unauthorized use, or the historical
dependence of academic inquiry on the unfettered flow of information.
They certainly do not appear to appreciate the reputational goods so crucial
to the academic enterprise, where a young assistant professor may wisely
decide that adoption of his monograph or article in leading courses on a
topic is worth far more than the royalties he might be able to extract from
users. Even if the publishers who ultimately controlled the copyright in
such works failed to recognize their own interest in the enhanced reputation
of their authors, the court should have recognized this.
By contrast, Sony evidences a sophisticated understanding of the
economics of broadcasting. It "rejected respondents' prediction 'that live
television or movie audiences will decrease as more people watch Betamax
tapes as an alternative,"' observing that "'[there] is no factual basis for [the
underlying] assumption.' 73  The majority also agreed with the district
court's conclusion that, "To the extent any decrease in advertising revenues
would occur, the court concluded that the Studios had 'marketing
alternatives at hand to recoup some of that predicted loss,"'7 4 since
"[Plaintiffs] stand ready to make their product available in cassettes and
compete with the VTR industry." 75 In other words, the onus was on the
copyrightholders to adjust to the new technology, and not vice versa.
73 Sony Corp. of Amer. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. [hereinafter Sony], 464 U.S. 417,
452 (1984) (quoting Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Amer., 480 F. Supp. 429, 466
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)). The district court had rejected respondents' "fear that persons
'watching' the original telecast of a program will not be measured in the live audience and
the ratings and revenues will decrease," by observing that current measurement technology
allows the Betamax audience to be reflected. 480 F. Supp. at 466.
74 Sony, 464 U.S. at 484 (quoting 480 F. Supp. at 452)
75 Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Amer., 480 F. Supp. at 452.
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Assuming the development of future "marketing alternatives" may
appear to be a facile response to copyrightholders' concerns about losing
control of their work. However, the Sony Court could rely on evidence that
the VTR had already enhanced the value of the copyrights at issue in many
ways, and would continue to do so. The fast-forwarding audience lost to
advertisers may well have been offset by those who, once consigned by
work or "counterprogramming" to miss shows, now would be able to view
them later. Quoting the district court's summary of its fair use finding, the
majority explained:
The audience benefits from the time-shifting capability
have already been discussed. It is not implausible that
benefits could also accrue to plaintiffs, broadcasters, and
advertisers, as the Betamax makes it possible for more
16persons to view their broadcasts.
Here the majority explicitly acknowledged the very real possibility of lost
viewers and advertising dollars for the plaintiffs.77  However, it also
factored in the potential benefits of widespread VTR distribution, and
presciently concluded that these new opportunities would swamp its
negative effects. The Sony majority recognized that "effect on the market"
analysis should not end with a determination that a contested use would
potentially have negative effects on a potential market for copyrighted
work. Potential positive effects are relevant as well.
B. TECHNICAL COMPATIBILITY CASES
The Ninth Circuit reprised the Sony majority's comprehensive
economic analysis in Sega v. Accolade.78 Defendant Accolade had "reverse
engineered" Sega's computer game software in order to make its own
products interoperable with Sega's hardware (the "Genesis console") and
software. The reverse engineering required copying and "disassembly" or
"decompilation" of Sega's game software. 79  Among other defenses,
76 Sony, 464 U.S. at 454 (quoting 480 F. Supp. at 452).
77 Id.. Compare Napster, which refused to acknowledge positive effects once the court
determined that Napster would harm the plaintiffs' entry into digital distribution markets.
78 Sega v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). The rule of Sega is often put as
"[W]here disassembly is the only way to gain access to the ideas and functional elements
embodied in a copyrighted computer program and where there is a legitimate reason for
seeking such access, disassembly is a fair use of the copyrighted work, as a matter of law."
Id. at 1527-28. Beyond that bright line rule, Sega may well also stand for a judicial
willingness to permit copying of small portions of competitor's software in order to
promote interoperability.
79 This has been called "intermediate copying;" e.g., "none of the [plaintiff's] copyrighted
material was copied into, or appeared in, [the defendant's final product." Sony Computer
Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 600 (9th Cir. 2000).
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Accolade contended that the reverse engineering was a fair use of the
software because it was the only means of revealing "the unprotected ideas
and functional concepts" embodied in the code. The panel's opinion
conceded that games developed by Accolade might compete with Sega in
some respects, but saw this substitution as swamped by the potential
positive effects on the market for Sega's consoles and games:
By facilitating the entry of a new competitor, the first lawful one
that is not a Sega licensee, Accolade's disassembly of Sega's
software undoubtedly "affected" the market for Genesis-
compatible games in an indirect fashion .... [But] video game
users typically purchase more than one game. There is no basis
for assuming that Accolade's "Ishido" has significantly affected
the market for Sega's "Altered Beast," since a consumer might
easily purchase both ... In any event, an attempt to monopolize
the market by making it impossible for others to compete runs
counter to the statutory purpose of promoting creative expression
and cannot constitute a strong equitable basis for resisting the
invocation of the fair use doctrine. Thus, we conclude that the
fourth statutory factor weighs in Accolade's, not Sega's, favor,
notwithstanding the minor economic loss Sega may suffer.80
Some commentators have criticized Sega for considering the social
benefits of reverse engineering in the context of the fourth factor, which is
focused on the value of the copyrighted work itself.81 Calling Accolade's
use fair clearly deprives Sega the opportunity to license its software to
Accolade. Yet the two are not so easily disentangled. It's easy to imagine
Accolade software as complementary, and not simply substituting for, Sega
software; a consumer delighted by one good software purchase may
develop a taste for others. 82  Moreover, as Apple quickly learned, a
company trying to monopolize manufacture of hardware and software for a
proprietary operating system may quickly lose market share to a competitor
more willing to deal with other firms.
8 3
80 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523-24.
" Since the four fair use factors are noninclusive, courts are permitted to consider overall
social benefits of a fair use finding, as well as First Amendment considerations. See, e.g.,
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975,
1023-24 (2002).
82 As James Boyle suggests, even direct piracy may lead to situations that ultimately
complement the pirated product. See Boyle, Mean, Cruel, or Lavish, supra note 4, at 2017
(positing that "the losses to Microsoft from the increased ease with which Word [can] be
pirated [may be less] than the benefits they get from network effects," since those using the
pirated software become increasingly proficient with its interfaces and thereby create a
workforce more capable of working with Microsoft products than with those of its
competitors).
83 See, e.g., ADAM BRANDENBERGER & BARRY NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION (1998)
(discussing the new business practices enabled by network connectivity).
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The Sega rule has guided future decisions and was even reflected in
part of the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).84 However,
other portions of the DMCA providing "paracopyright" legal protection to
encryption devices used to prevent unauthorized access to copyrighted
works may limit the significance of Sega. 85 Encryption devices can prevent
all copying-even that protected under the fair use doctrine-and the
DMCA makes trafficking in circumvention devices illegal. 86  Skilled
"hackers" can often figure out methods of circumventing digital rights
management systems, but the DMCA's anticircumvention provisions make
such hacks illegal. It is currently unclear whether circumvention performed
in order to permit a "fair use" is illegal. Recently the Second Circuit was
very dismissive of claims of a fair use right to use anti-circumvention
devices in order to obtain a digital copy of a film:
[T]he Appellants have provided no support for their premise that
fair use of DVD movies is constitutionally required to be made
by copying the original work in its original format.... We know
of no authority for the proposition that fair use, as protected by
the Copyright Act, much less the Constitution, guarantees
copying by the optimum method or in the identical format of the
original. 87
The court goes on to explain that fair users may just have to make analog
copies of movies as presented on television screens, or resort to other
"horse and buggy" methods of reproduction. 88
This approach arguably permits fair use in the case of audiovisual
works, but has little applicability to software. Encryption devices can keep
proprietary software source code "hidden from view" and inaccessible to
reverse engineering. Aware of this dilemma, the Copyright Office began a
rulemaking process addressing potential exceptions to the anti-
84 See the DMCA's legislative overruling of part of the holding of MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), via The Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. § 117(c) (2000) (providing that it is not infringement for the owner of a machine to
make a copy of a computer program if the copy is made automatically by virtue of the
activation of a machine that contains a licensed copy of the computer program, for repair
and maintenance purposes).
" 17 U.S.C. § 1201. See United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1140 (N.D.
Cal. 2002) (quoting S. Rep. 105-190, at 8) ("Due to the ease with which digital works can
be copied and distributed worldwide virtually instantaneously, copyright owners will
hesitate to make their works readily available on the Internet without reasonable assurance
that they will be protected against massive piracy.").
86 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Bloom, Copy Protection for DVD Video, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
IEEE, July 1999, at 1268. (noting the creation in 1996 of the Content Scrambling System
(CSS), the Analog Protection System (APS) and the Copy Generation Management System
(CGMS) by the Copy Protection Technical Working Group)
87 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 459 (2001).
88 id.
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circumvention provisions of the DMCA. 89 Unfortunately, the rulemaking
has been going on at a glacial pace, providing for only a very narrow list of
exceptions that do not go very far to protect fair use.
Though shrouded in technical detail, these rulemakings, and related
court cases on fair use in the context of anticircumvention claims, may play
a very important role in promoting fair competition in the digital economy.
Many companies are now using software not only functionally, to advance
the operation of their products, but as a competitive tool, to deny access to
competitors to markets related to their products.90 Using copyright not to
protect the underlying code involved (which is often trivially easy to
break), but as a competitive tool to deny interoperability of complementary
goods, is a goal far removed from the original intent of the Constitution's
copyright clause. It does not deserve the respect that some courts, and the
Copyright Office, have often accorded it.91 A more complete fourth factor
analysis, such as that engaged in in Sega, would alert courts to the anti-
competitive implications of expansive copyright protection here.
C. ARRANGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION CASES
89 Copyright Office, Rulemaking on Exemptions from Prohibition on Circumvention of
Technological Measures that Control Access to Copyrighted Works,
http://www.copyright.gov/1201 /(last visited Apr. 11, 2006).
90 See Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Tech., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004). As
one commentator explains, "Chamberlain, a manufacturer of a garage door opener (GDO)
sued Skylink, a universal remote control manufacturer, in part, for violation of the DMCA.
Chamberlain's GDO system utilized a copyrighted computer program called 'rolling code'
that acted as a security measure by changing the signal that the transmitter needs to send to
the garage door. Chamberlain's GDO incorporated a rolling code mechanism that created a
window of bit streams. When a signal is sent from a transmitter that falls within the
window it would allow the opener to activate the motor and open the garage door. If the
data sent from the transmitter fell outside of this window, the GDO would ignore it and the
garage door will stay shut. However, should the user send two signals within quick
succession of one another and the two bit stream sent differ by three, the GDO would enter
into a resynchronization module that would reset the window and allow the transmitter to
operate the garage door. Skylink's program did not incorporate the rolling program yet
nonetheless was capable of controlling the GDO. Skylink's transmitter simulated the
rolling code and resynchronization methods by sending signals in rapid succession, two of
which differ by three. This caused the GDO to either immediately accept the incoming
signal or to enter into the resynchronization mode and allow the transmitter to operate the
garage door. Chamberlain claimed that Skylink was liable under the DMCA on the
grounds that the GDO contained copyright protected computer programs and that the
rolling code acted as a technology measure that operated to control access to the
programs." Sandro Ocasio, Proper Application of Merger Doctrine in Anticircumvention
Claims, 2 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript on file with author).
91 For a good example of judicial skepticism toward these claims, see Chamberlain Group,
381 F.3d 1178, which rejects the claim that garage door openers merited the protection of
anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA on grounds that copyright owner failed to
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Though some commentators claim that intellectual property's chief
purpose is to create more information, its organization is becoming
increasingly important in an era of information overload. 92 Unfortunately,
would-be catalogers, archivists, arrangers and guides are often menaced by
a thicket of potential copyright claimants who would demand licensing fees
merely to be included in the compilation. The courts are divided on the
merits of such claims, and the cases often hinge on judges' ability to
recognize the ways in which unauthorized arrangement and organization of
copyrighted works may be essential to a thriving market in information.
Courts have affirmed fair use in the case of internet archives of photos, and
a comprehensive collector's guide to a brand of stuffed animals, but have
resisted it in the case of an interactive site utilizing movie clips.
In Kelly v. Arriba Soft, Arriba's search engine, now located at
www.ditto.com, permitted Internet users to find images by searching its
archives. 93 Kelly, a nature photographer, sued Arriba Soft for including his
images in its archive. Arriba's website provided two services: 1) lists of
"thumbnail" visions of the images (reduced in size and thus quality) and 2)
framing of the full-size image (which appeared on Arriba's website exactly
as it had on its source page).
The Ninth Circuit ruled the first use to be a fair use largely on the
basis of its "effect on the market" analysis. The panel recognized that the
plaintiffs images "are related to several potential markets," including
attracting internet users to Kelly's own website (which sold digital and print
versions of the images and other materials), and being sold or licensed to
other websites or to a "stock database." 94  Observing that Arriba's
thumbnail images actually directed users to Kelly's site, the panel found no
evidence that it reduced the value of his images as a type of advertising for
his site.95 The panel also found that the "low resolution" thumbnails in no
way competed with the full size images in markets for images. 96 However,
since the full-size images Arriba made available did divert internet users
from Kelly's website, and effectively substituted for the images Kelly
would have sold, the panel was agnostic on the fairness of this use and
ordered the district court to consider more closely the economic effects of
this type of reproduction.9
7
show either that the access was unauthorized or that there was a reasonable relationship
between the alleged circumvention and any infringement of copyright.
92 See Frank Pasquale, The Law and Economics of Information Overload Externalities, 59
VAND. L. REv. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript on file with author).
9' Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).94 [d. at 821.
95 Id.
96 [d. at 821-22.
97 The panel addressed the diverse markets for the photos involved:
By giving users access to Kelly's full-sized images on its own website,
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The Kelly panel's opinion offers a model of complex "fourth factor"
analysis that recognizes the complexity of the economic effects of
unauthorized use. Richard Posner previously offered doctrinal recognition
of this complexity in Ty, Inc. v. Publications International Limited. In this
case, Ty, the owner of copyrights in various "Beanie Babies" (stuffed
animals copyrighted as "sculptural works") sued the publisher of books
featuring images of Beanie Babies (including a collector's guide and a
"picture book" entitled For Love of Beanie Babies). Reversing the district
court's summary judgment ruling in favor of Ty, the panel remanded the
case for reconsideration of, inter alia, the market effects of PIL's work on
both Beanie Babies generally and properly licensed derivative works.
Building on his co-authored work The Economic Structure of Intellectual
Property Law, 98 Judge Posner's opinion both cabined the range of
permissible licensing demands and illuminated the positive effects of
unauthorized uses on the value of copyrighted works. Most illuminating is
the opinion's veritable common law codification of the
substitute/complement distinction in fair use law:
Generalizing from this example in economic terminology that
has become orthodox in fair-use case law, we may say that
copying that is complementary to the copyrighted work (in the
sense that nails are complements of hammers) is fair use, but
copying that is a substitute for the copyrighted work (in the
sense that nails are substitutes for pegs or screws), or for
derivative works from the copyrighted work, is not fair use. If
the price of nails fell, the demand for hammers would rise but
the demand for pegs would fall. The hammer manufacturer
wants there to be an abundant supply of cheap nails, and
likewise publishers want their books reviewed and wouldn't
want reviews inhibited and degraded by a rule requiring the
reviewer to obtain a copyright license from the publisher if he
wanted to quote from the book.99
Arriba harms all of the Kelly's markets. Users will no longer have to
go to Kelly's website to see the full-sized images, thereby deterring
people from visiting his website. In addition, users would be able to
download the full-sized images from Arriba's site and then sell or
license those images themselves, reducing Kelly's opportunity to well
or license his own images.
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 948 (9th Cir. 2002), withdrawn, Kelly v. Arriba
Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
98 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 121 (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2003).
99Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing On Davis v. The Gap, Inc.,
246 F.3d 152, 175-76 (2d Cir. 2001)). For more on the substitute/complement distinction,
see, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1277 (1 1th Cir. 2001)
(concurring opinion); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and
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Judge Posner's recognition of the positive economic effects arising from
book reviews applies to complementary goods generally. While the
recording function of the VCR may have made the technology a rival of the
Sony plaintiffs, the playback function made it technology as complementary
to audiovisual content as hammers are to nails.
Were the district court correct in unequivocally categorizing PIL's
publications as the proper subject of licensing by Ty, the effect on the
market analysis would be straightforward. Clearly PIL would be usurping a
market that Ty was entitled either to license or develop on its own.
However, as Judge Posner recognizes, PIL's various publications deserved
separate analysis on this score. The panel judged For Love of Beanie
Babies, a children's book whose central appeal was amusing arrangements
of particular "species" of Beanie Babies into scenes, as "essentially just a
collection of photographs of Beanie Babies, and photographs of Beanie
Babies are derivative works from the copyrighted Beanie Babies
themselves."'
100
At the opposite extreme is PIL's Beanie Babies Collector's
Guide. This is a small paperback book with small print,
clearly oriented toward adult purchasers--indeed, as the title
indicates, toward collectors. Each page contains, besides a
photograph of a Beanie Baby, the release date, the retired
date, the estimated value of the Beanie Baby, and other
information relevant to a collector, such as that "Spooky is
the only Beanie ever to have carried his designer's name,"
or that "Prance should be a member of the Beanie line for
some time, so don't panic and pay high secondary-market
prices for her just because she's fairly new." Some of the
text is quite critical, for example accusing Ty of frequent
trademark infringements. 101
The Ty court notes that Ty only licensed the right to publish photos of
Beanie Babies to authors of collectors' guides who promise not to criticize
Ty in their guides
Judge Reinhardt's opinion in Sega v. Accolade takes Posner's
insight here to a higher level of abstraction. 10 2 That opinion held that "an
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600,
1643 n. 237 (1982). Though framed as a recognition and reaffirmation of the
substitute/complement distinction, Posner's formulation here is in fact an elegant
crystallization of caselaw suggesting that the positive effects of an unauthorized use had to
"count" in "effect on the market" analysis.
10' Ty, 292 F.3d at 521.
101 Id., at 519-520.
102 Sega v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[W]here disassembly is the
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attempt to monopolize the market by making it impossible for others to
compete runs counter to the statutory purpose of promoting creative
expression and cannot constitute a strong equitable basis for resisting the
invocation of the fair use doctrine." 10 3 The panel's opinion conceded that
games developed by Accolade might compete with Sega in some respects,
but saw this substitution as swamped by the potential positive effects on the
market for Sega's consoles and games.
The structure of both Accolade and Posner's Ty, Inc. opinion are
rather similar. Each opinion identifies an ideal "ecology" of intellectual
property in the industry in question, and then goes on to explain why a fair
use holding in the particular case instantiates a general rule necessary to
preserving that pattern of interdependence. 104  In Ty, a rule protecting
collector's guides is deemed essential to avoid a state of affairs in which all
collector's guides need to be licensed by those they rate, and consumers
can't trust whether they're getting accurate information about the market or
are simply being fed information helpful to the interests of dominant IP
owners. In Accolade, the court worried that denying permission to copy in
order to reverse engineer might leave a single company in control of the
market for videogames, when even that company may well benefit from a
more vigorously competitive marketplace. 1
05
Recognition of positive effects does not always mean that the fair
use defendant wins on the fourth factor. The determination may be
negative, or neutral. In Video Pipeline, a company specializing in the
business of movie preview compilation and organization sold clips of
movies, without permission from the movie copyright holders, to retailers
for use on their websites. 106 Users could not download the clips, but each
time a user viewed a clip on a retailer's website, the retailer paid a fee to the
movie preview company. The copyright holders of the movies claimed that
the use of the clips constituted copyright infringement.
The district court sensitively addressed the "effect on the market"
factor accounting for both potential negative 10 7 as well as positive 10 8 effects
only way to gain access to the ideas and functional elements embodied in a copyrighted
computer program and where there is a legitimate reason for seeking such access,
disassembly is a fair use of the copyrighted work, as a matter of law.").
103 Id.
104 By ecology here I mean to indicate a delicate balance of interacting forms which can
easily be thrown out of balance by the domination of any one particular form. EBAN S.
GOODSTEIN, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 10 (1999).
105 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526 ("If disassembly of copyrighted object code is per se an unfair
use, the owner of the copyright gains a defacto monopoly over the functional aspects of his
work--aspects that were expressly denied copyright protection by Congress.").
106 Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 321, 342-43
(D.N.J. 2002), aff'd, 342 F.3d 191 (3rd Cir. 2003).
107 There exists "the possibility that potential customers will be discouraged from
purchasing or renting certain videos due to the depiction of the movie as provided by Video
Pipeline's clip previews . . . [and,] [m]oreover, the evidence that Video Pipeline's video
SPRING 2006
TOWARD AN ECOLOGY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
resulting from the unauthorized distribution of the clips. Additionally, the
court did not find that the movie clips substituted for the copyrighted films
or for derivatives of the films. 10 9 The trial judge recognized that the
contested site would increase exposure to the work. 110 Visitors to retailers'
websites, "who might otherwise be unaware of, or unattracted to" the films,
would have a chance to view clips.' 1 These determinations left the district
court unconvinced by the plaintiffs' assertions that the Video Pipeline
service reduced the value of their copyrighted works.
Unfortunately, the appellate court unfairly restricted the scope of the
fourth factor inquiry: "Because the issues pertaining to the potential harm to
the market for Disney's derivative trailers are more straightforward we
focus our analysis on this area and do not review the District Court's"'
consideration of the site's effect on the value of the underlying films. Like
the Texaco panel, the appellate court found (rather unsurprisingly) that
Video Pipeline's unauthorized use of the trailers denied the plaintiffs the
right to charge for that content. The appellate panel did not even consider
whether potential positive effects on sales or rentals of the underlying
movies could swamp the negative effect of a fair use finding on the market
for trailers. As Judge Posner's analysis in Ty suggests, the existence of
reviewing sites uncontrolled by the owners of the material reviewed may be
essential to the assurance of trustworthy sources of information about
movies or collector's items.
D. THE DUBIOUS LEGAL BASIS OF THE NARROW APPROACH TO FOURTH
FACTOR ANALYSIS
As cases like Video Pipeline and Texaco demonstrate, there is bound
to be some judicial resistance to a fourth factor analysis that takes into
account all the effects of unauthorized use on the value of the copyrighted
work at issue. However, that resistance is based not on the copyright law
itself, but rather on a misinterpretation of the relevant fair use provisions
(namely, 17 U.S.C. § 107(4)'s requirement that the court consider the effect
of unauthorized use on "the potential market for or the value of the
copyrighted work"). Justice Blackmun most clearly expressed this
misinterpretation in his dissent in Sony v. Universal:
previews are low in quality ... also suggests that the market for purchasing or renting the
copyrighted motion pictures may be detrimentally affected." Id. at 340. "Video Pipeline's
service of providing online previews to retailers' customers may also affect the
marketability of the copyrighted motion pictures due the retailers' competition with ...
[the copyright holder] in online sales." Id. at 341.
108 See id. at 340-43.
109 See id.
110 Id. at 341.
I Id.
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The requirement that a putatively infringing use of a copyrighted
work, to be "fair," must not impair a "potential" market for the
work has [an important implication]. [To prevail, an] infringer
must demonstrate that he had not impaired the copyright holder's
ability to demand compensation from (or to deny access to) any
group who would otherwise be willing to pay to see or hear the
copyrighted work.'12
The dissent facilely equates the statutory requirement to consider the effect
of the use on "the potential market for or the value of the copyrighted work"
with an examination of the effect of the use on one potential use of the
work--namely, that which would have to be licensed if the use at issue were
not to be declared fair. If § 107(4) did not effectively define "market"
broadly by equating it with the "value of' the copyrighted work,113 this
decision to define "market" as a small subdivision of potential licensees
would perhaps be defensible purely as a matter of cabining the meaning of
an ambiguous term.
However, such a crabbed interpretation would be illogical in the
larger context of fair use analysis. As Lydia Pallas Loren has noted, "The
argument that 'lost' permission fees are proof of fourth factor harm has as
its premise the legal conclusion at issue: that the use at issue is not a fair use
and, therefore, the owner is allowed to charge permission fees for such
use." 114 Proof of lost licensing revenue is possible in any contemporary fair
use case. It's in the very nature of a "test" or "factor" that it be possible for
it to go in either direction; however, Justice Blackmun's interpretation
means it can only militate against the defendant.
Unfortunately, a milder version of Blackmun's narrow approach
crept into the latest Supreme Court pronouncement on fair use, Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose. In that case, the plaintiff sued the group 2 Live Crew for
appropriating parts of the Roy Orbison song "Pretty Woman" into a
112 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 484-485 (1984).
The language is also careless in suggesting that a negative fourth factor finding can
automatically prevent a fair use finding. There are many cases where the disparagement of
a work (i.e., in a scathing review) obviously suppresses the market for it (and its
derivatives), but is nonetheless fair (because the balance of other factors support the use).
113In § 107(4), we are clearly not dealing with the disjunctive "or" (see HUD v. Rucker),
but with the synonymous "or" denoting the equivalence of the terms "potential market" and
"value of." "Or" is often "used to indicate a synonymous or equivalent expression."
Dictionary. corn, at http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q-or (last visited Apr. 18, 2006).
114 Lydia Pallas Lorren, Redefining the Market Failure, supra note 26; see also NIMMER, §
13.05[A][4] (extensively discussing the circularity problem); Gideon Parchomovsky, Fair
Use, Efficiency, and Corrective Justice, 3 LEGAL THEORY 347, 359 (1997) ("[T]he ability
to charge by itself cannot possibly determine legal rights. A hoodlum might have the
ability to charge protection fees, and yet no one would argue that this in itself gives him a
right to do that .... Absent an underlying theory of rights, the ability to charge is
normatively meaningless.").
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Rabelaisian mockery of unattractive and unfaithful women. 115 The case is
largely remembered for its first factor analysis affirming the importance of
parody in fair use jurisprudence. Despite finding 2 Live Crew's rap to be a
parody, the Court remanded the case for further consideration by the district
court, including a fourth factor inquiry into the degree to which 2 Live
Crew's rap reduced the value of the song via displacement (rather than
disparagement): 116
2 Live Crew's song comprises not only parody but also rap music,
and the derivative market for rap music is a proper focus of
enquiry. Evidence of substantial harm to it would weigh against a
finding of fair use, because the licensing of derivatives is an
important economic incentive to the creation of originals ...
[Therefore, each side should submit on remand] evidence or
affidavits addressing the likely effect of 2 Live Crew's parodic rap
song on the market for a nonparody, rap version of 'Oh, Pretty
Woman."' 7
Of course, the Court only deemed the derivative market for rap music "a
proper focus of enquiry," not the proper focus of enquiry (as the Sony
dissent would have it). Campbell did recognize the validity of 2 Live
Crew's submission of evidence that its version of the song did not harm the
market for the original song, and might actually increase its notoriety.
118
However, the majority's insistence that "a silent record on [the derivative
rap market] disentitled the proponent of the defense, 2 Live Crew, to
summary judgment" elevated the importance of derivative markets to an
unfortunate extent. 119 As David Nimmer's recent survey of fair use cases
has shown, 120 appellate courts have been quick to seize on harm to narrowly
... Sample lyrics include "Bald headed woman girl your hair won't grow/ Bald headed
woman you got a teeny weeny afro." Campbell, 510 U.S. at 596.
116 This classic distinction in fair use law is intended to exempt certain negative affects on
the market from being considered in the fourth factor inquiry. If a scathing review or
cutting parody reduces sales for a work, it has most likely done so by disparaging the work.
This kind of market harm is not counted. However, an abridgment of the work or
unauthorized copy may usurp sales simply by substituting for the work. That market harm
is counted in the fourth factor inquiry. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 ("Because 'parody
may quite legitimately aim at garroting the original, destroying it commercially as well as
artistically,' the role of the courts is to distinguish between 'biting criticism [that merely]
suppresses demand [and] copyright infringement[, which] usurps it."').
'7 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593.
18Id at 591 n.21.
119 Id. at 590. "Since fair use is an affirmative defense, its proponent would have difficulty
carrying the burden of demonstrating fair use without favorable evidence about relevant
markets. In moving for summary judgment, 2 Live Crew left themselves at just such a
disadvantage when they failed to address the effect on the market for rap derivatives, and
confined themselves to uncontroverted submissions that there was no likely effect on the
market for the original." Id.
120 David Nimmer, "Fairest of them All" and other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW &
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construed derivative markets as the key to fourth factor inquiry, and have
ignored Campbell's parallel approbation of defense evidence showing
positive effects on the market for the work.
121
E. CRITICAL IP SCHOLARS' RESPONSE: ATTACK ON ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS AND RECOURSE TO FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES
Alarmed by such circularity in leading economic analyses of fair
use, a number of critical IP scholars have attempted to downplay the
importance of economic analyses in fair use findings. James Boyle's
blistering critique of Clinton-era internet policy has illuminated the
important First Amendment and expressive values at stake in copyright law
that may be insufficiently protected by an individualized, private ownership
regime. 122 Eben Moglen argues that IP laws are self-defeating, impeding
the very innovation they profess to promote. 123 Nearly all of the scholars
contributing to the 2001 Duke Conference on the Public Domain to some
extent supported Boyle's plea for ending the "second enclosure movement"
of expanding IP protections. 124
Boyle argues that the new digital economy renders classical
economic analysis of intellectual property irrelevant. He emphasizes the
fundamental indeterminacy of economic analysis of IP protections:
Information economics as a discipline does indeed enlarge our
CONTEMP. PROBS. 263 (2003).
121 Courts may not be entirely to blame here. Copyright defendants are often strapped for
resources and unable to find the kind of economic experts capable of developing "positive
effects" evidence. However, even when they do, skeptical trial courts may fault the
methodology of the studies or the credentials of the expert. See A & M Records v.
Napster, 114 F.Supp.2d 896, 910 ("[T]he report by defendant's expert, Dr. Peter S. Fader,
does not provide credible evidence that music file-sharing on Napster stimulates more CD
sales than it displaces.").
122 James Boyle, The First Amendment and Cyberspace: The Clinton Years, 63 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 337 (Winter/Spring 2000); James Boyle, Intellectual Property Online, A
Young Person's Guide, 10 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 47 (1997) (imagining what might have
happened in defamation law had there been no New York Times v. Sullivan, and lamenting
IP law's failure to appreciate the constitutional dimensions of what appear to be merely
private disputes over the use of information).
123 See Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright,
FIRST MONDAY: A PEER-REVIEWED JOURNAL OF THE INTERNET,
http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/anarchism.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2006)
("[T]he digital revolution alters two aspects of political economy that have been otherwise
invariant throughout human history. All software has zero marginal cost in the world of the
Net, while the costs of social coordination have been so far reduced as to permit the rapid
formation and dissolution of large-scale and highly diverse social groupings entirely
without geographic limitation.").
124 See Duke Conference on the Public Domain, http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/realcast.htm
(last visited Apr. 18, 2006).
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understanding of some very important intellectual property
questions, but I believe that the answers it offers are, on both
empirical and theoretical grounds, much more open than is
generally accepted. Indeed, one of its main contributions may be
in offering us plot-lines and econo-dramas, ready-made images
of types of dysfunction in information markets that sharpen our
perceptions of potential risks and benefits. Unfortunately, it
tends to offer them in antagonistic and mutually annihilating
. 125pairs.
As Boyle notes, orthodox and static economic models may blind courts to
restrictive rules' long-term effects on innovation and marginal players. 
126
Focusing instead on the first factor-the "purpose and character of
the use"-critical IP scholars have tried to infuse fair use analysis with First
Amendment values and a progressive sense of the ultimate policy behind
the copyright clause of Article I of the constitution. 127 This new scholarship
raises important issues about the constitutional limits of intellectual
property protection. 12 8 However, it should be complemented by a richer,
12' Boyle, supra note 4, at 2009. Conservative scholars have also questioned the economics
behind IP rights; see, e.g., GEORGE PRIEST, WHAT ECONOMISTS CAN TELL LAWYERS
ABOUT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS
OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 21 (J. Palmer & R. Zerbe, eds.) (1986) (warning that "in the
current state of knowledge, economists know almost nothing about the effect on social
welfare of the patent system or other systems of intellectual property."); Douglas Clement,
Creation Myths: Does Innovation Require Intellectual Property Rights?, REASON (March
2003), available at http://www.reason.com/0303/fe.dc.creation.shtml.
126 Id. But see Mark Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property (Review
of Boyle's Shamans, Software, and Spleens), 75 TEX. L. REV. 873, 889-91 (1997) (arguing
that "it is not at all clear that Boyle's critique of the economic analysis of information is as
devastating as he makes it out to be. His primary focus in that critique is on the two
different ways in which economics treats information--as a predicate to an efficient market
transaction and as a commodity. Boyle views this as a fundamental contradiction which
brings down the whole enterprise. It is not .... '[P]erfect information' does not have the
pride of place in economics that Boyle thinks it does. At least outside of introductory
economics classes, economic analysis has done away with the formal assumption of perfect
information, and much of the modeling that does occur takes account of uncertainty,
'rational ignorance,' and information disparity.").
127 James Boyle, The First Amendment and Cyberspace: The Clinton Years, 63 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 337, 345 (2000); Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First
Amendment Defenses in Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REV. 836
(1983); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354 (1999).
128 However, in light of the Eldred v. Reno decision upholding the Copyright Term
Extension Act, it is unclear how effectively courts can circumscribe copyrightholders'
rights due to First Amendment principles. Though stating that the fair use defense is a
"built-in First Amendment accommodation" of copyright law, the Court was unclear as to
whether the doctrine should be expanded in any way in order to reflect First Amendment
concerns. Eldred, 123 S. Ct. 769, 788 (2003). The majority may be suggesting that fair
use doctrine, as it stands, already accommodates First Amendment values to the necessary
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more complex account of "effect on the market" analysis. Such an account
may not always promote broader access to IP, but as Part III below
demonstrates, it will at least allow a more informed discussion of the
economic impact of fair use decisions.
129
11. THE ECONOMIC BASIS FOR COMPREHENSIVE FOURTH FACTOR
ANALYSIS
Information goods exhibit two complementary phenomena, often to
the extent they are able to be copied. First, most information goods are
nonexcludable, barring protective measures. In other words, once one
person has access to a physical instantiation of the information good, it's
hard to keep that person from sharing it with others via copying. 3 ° Digital
technology has exponentially increased information goods'
nonexcludability by making them much easier to copy.131 Copyrightholders
have successfully pushed for stronger copyright protection in response to
this situation. 132  On the other hand, digital distribution has generated
immense opportunities not only for uncompensated copying, but also for
costless distribution, of copyrightholders' work.1
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Sony legitimized judicial recognition of the long-term positive
effects of contested uses. In response to the plaintiffs' worries over lost
advertising revenue, the Supreme Court endorsed the district court's
conclusion that the studios had other marketing alternatives available. The
Court refused to assume that the market for entertainment goods would
remain static, and instead focused on the new commercial possibilities
enabled by the contested use. This approach is not only faithful to the
statutory language in 17 U.S.C. § 107, but is also backed by a great deal of
research in information economics. Both economics and business scholars
have recognized that widespread use-whether authorized or not-can have
tremendous economic benefits for information goods. These benefits fall
degree.
121 Cf Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 n.21 ("Even favorable evidence, without more, is no
guarantee of fairness. Judge Leval gives the example of the film producer's appropriation
of a composer's previously unknown song that turns the song into a commercial success;
the boon to the song does not make the film's simple copying fair."). "Effect on the
market" analysis is only one of four factors determining fair use; courts have the discretion
to refuse to deem simple copying fair even if it ultimately enhances the value of the copied
work.
130 The first sale doctrine also protects the owner's right to dispose of the work. See 17
U.S.C. § 109.
131 Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002).
132 See list of legislation expanding copyrightholders' rights, supra n. Error! Bookmark
not defined..
133 See Ku, supra n. 131, at 267-68 ("[The] nature of digital information ... makes viral
distribution possible at no cost to the content provider.").
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into two main categories: network effects and complementarity.
Network effects occur whenever the prevalence of a certain good
leads to an increase in the demand for the good. For example, a telephone
is worth more to a consumer when 90% of the rest of consumers have a
telephone, than when 10% of them do, because there are so many more
people to call in the former situation. Network effects enable positive
feedback loops in the consumption of both content and the media that carry
it:
Network externalities arise when the utility that a user derives
from a product increases with the number of other individuals
who also use the product. These externalities have several
sources. Direct network externalities exist when the number of
users affects the quality of the product itself. Communications
products such as telephones and fax machines exhibit this type of
effect, as these products become more useful as more individuals
obtain them. 
134
Finally, the VCR itself exhibited direct network externalities-the more
people who owned it, the greater its value, as the extent and quality of video
rental stores and other useful items associated with the item rose. And as
VCR penetration soared, the device became increasingly complementary to
the films watched on it, as more and more people began to rent films.
135
Complementarity occurs whenever one good enhances demand for
another good. 136 Hammers, for instance, are a complement for nails, and
vice versa: the more common either is, the greater the demand for the other.
Many of the positive effect cases mentioned above focus on the
complementarity of the unauthorized use to certain markets for the
copyrighted good in question. For example, the search engine in Arriba
Soft was a complement to the images it categorized: once users' viewing of
thumbnail images on Ditto.com was deemed fair, then Ditto.com's archive
(a complementary service) could expand and attract more people to the
plaintiff s images (the core product). In Sega, Judge Reinhardt accepted the
defendant's contention that competition in the market for games (a
complementary product) would generate more and better games, which in
turn would enhance demand for Sega's console and games (the core
134 Dana R. Wagner, The Keepers of The Gates: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and the
Regulatory Implications of Systems Technology, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 1073, 1096 (2000).
135 For an account of this process, see LARDNER, supra note 66, at 200-225.
136 Wagner calls complementarity an "indirect network externality." See Wagner, supra
note 134, at 1097 ("Indirect network externalities exist when the number of users affects
the availability of complementary products and services, which in turn affects the value of
the core product."). To clarify the two effects here, and to address the full range of
complementarities evident in some fair use cases, I have treated direct network effects as
the whole of network effects and treat complementarities in general separately.
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products). 137
By focusing on the long-term impact of dynamics like network
effects and complementarity, courts can conduct a more comprehensive
"effect on the market" analysis. They can also remedy the main
shortcomings of the narrow "fourth factor" analysis exemplified in Video
Pipeline, Texaco, and Justice Blackmun's dissent in Sony. As the following
discussions of information economics demonstrate, network effects and
complementarity are not merely idiosyncratic to the handful of fair use
cases where they have been explicitly recognized, but rather are essential to
our understanding of information markets.
A. NETWORK EFFECTS
We are conditioned to think of uncompensated copying as an
unmitigated loss for the copyrightholder, and many studies of "lost sales"
put forward by IP lobby groups (like the Business Software Alliance and
the Recording Industry Association of America) assume that any given
uncompensated copy is a lost sale at full price. This is obviously untrue
given that many of those copying either could not afford or would not be
willing to buy the given work. Furthermore, network effects give
copyrightholders the opportunity to indirectly appropriate the value of their
work. 13 8  For at least twenty years information economists have been
documenting this phenomenon. It has played an important role in many
industries. Both Microsoft's and Netscape's willingness to give away their
internet browser for free evidenced the companys' long-term perspectives:
that only one browser could succeed in the market, and that achieving
dominance in the long-term was worth short-term sacrifice of sales.
Given the complexity of information economics, any particular use
of a copyrighted work is likely to have not only negative, substitution
effects on the market for the work, but also positive, complementary
effects. 139 For example, unauthorized users of a software program may help
the program become an "industry standard," may suggest improvements to
the program in user communities, or may eventually purchase a license
Sega v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993).
138 This term likely originates in Stanley J. Liebowitz, Copying and Indirect
Appropriability: Photocopying of Journals, 93 J. POL. ECON. 945, 950 (1985). See also
Lisa N. Takeyama, The Intertemporal Consequences of Unauthorized Reproduction of
Intellectual ProperLy, 40 J.L. & EcON. 511, 512 (1997); but see Stan J. Liebowitz,
Economists' Topsy-Turvy View of Piracy, 2 REv. ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 5-17
(2005) (calling for more empirical confirmation of these models of indirect appropriation).
139 Building on his coauthored work The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law,
Judge Richard Posner advanced the basic microeconomic concept of complementary and
substitute goods in copyright law. Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, 292 F.3d 512, 518-19 (7th Cir.
2002); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 121 (2003).
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(once they have the money to buy it-or the money to lose in an
infringement action). 14  The Sony court presciently (albeit obscurely)
grasped the power of such network effects and complementary goods in
creative industries. 14 1 Network effects enable positive feedback loops in the
consumption of both content and the media that carry it:
Network externalities arise when the utility that a user
derives from a product increases with the number of other
individuals who also use the product. These externalities
have several sources. Direct network externalities exist
when the number of users affects the quality of the product
itself. Communications products such as telephones and fax
machines exhibit this type of effect, as these products
become more useful as more individuals obtain them.
Indirect network externalities exist when the number of
users affects the availability of complementary products and
services, which in turn affects the value of the core
product.1
42
The more uses-authorized or unauthorized-of a product, the more
noteworthy, popular, and important the product is likely to become.
Network effects prevail in a variety of industries, including "the
telephone, email, Internet, computer hardware, computer software, music
players, music titles, video players, video movies, banking services, airline
services, legal services, and many more." 143 As Oz Shy explains, all these
industries exhibit complementarity, compatibility, standards, consumption
externalities, switching costs, significant economies of scale, and lock-in.
44
Expanding on the traditional microeconomic definition of complementarity,
Shy explains that "Complementarity means that consumers in these markets
are shopping for systems (e.g., computers and software, cameras and film,
140 OZ SHY, THE ECONOMICS OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES 66 (2001) ("As observed by Connor
and Rumelt (1991), piracy has two economic impacts on software firms. First, piracy leads
to a fall in direct sales. However, by increasing the size of the installed base, it may also
boost the demand for the particular software.") (citing Kathleen Reavis Conner & Richard
P. Rumelt, Software Piracy: An Analysis of Protection Strategies, 37 MGMT. SCI. 125, 126
(1991)). See also Ariel Katz, A Network Effects Perspective on Software Piracy, 55 U.
TORONTO L.J. 155, 157 (2005).
141 See RICHARD CAVES, CREATIVE INDUSTRIES: CONTRACTS BETWEEN ART AND
COMMERCE 2-15 (1998) (discussing the idiosyncratic features of supply and demand for
content); HAL VARIAN & CARL SHAPIRO, INFORMATION RULES 12-20 (1999) (discussing
supply and demand of information and the tools used for its distribution and storage).
142 Wagner, supra note 134, at 1096. "An activity is said to generate a beneficial or
detrimental externality if that activity causes incidental benefits or damages to others, and
no corresponding compensation is provided to or paid to those who generate the
externality." BAUMOL & BLINDER, ECONOMICS 613 (1991).
143 SHY, supra note 140, at 1.
144 Id.
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music players and cassettes) rather than individual products."'145 Whenever
this occurs, the increasing prevalence or standardization of any one
component of the system can greatly increase the demand for other
components of the system.
B. EXPERIENCE GOODS
Industrial economist Richard Caves has investigated the
organization of creative activities-"why some creative activities occur in
ongoing organizations ('firms'), and others in one-off deals ('the
market').' ' 146 Caves's rich empirical study of various "creative industries"
(those in which the product or service "contains a substantial amount of
artistic or creative endeavor") 147 is organized around several common
themes. On the demand side, the uncertainty of demand leads to the
"nobody knows" problem: "There is great uncertainty about how consumers
will value a newly produced creative product, short of actually producing
the good and placing it before them."' 148 Since costs are often sunk, 149 "the
risk associated with any creative product is high."' 150  All these problems
arise in large part because information products are experience goods,
which need to be experienced in some way before consumers can judge
their value. 151
This uncertainty is often cited as a reason for guaranteeing strong IP
rights. Without such rights, IP producers may not be given adequate
incentives to produce such goods. However, markets for information have
also developed methods of dealing with uncertain demand that depend on
robust exceptions and limitations to IP rights. For instance, reviewers are
allowed to quote freely from a text in the course of reviewing it. Such "fair
uses" are not obviously helpful to the book in question-harsh reviews may
drive down sales. However, unlicensed reviews are, in general, an essential
tool for generating more information about books and encouraging sales. 1
52
Reviews are but one of many ways buyers and sellers overcome the
145 Id. at2.
146 CAVES, supra note 141, at 1-2.
147 Id. at vii.
148 CAVES, supra note 141, at 2.
149 "A sunk cost is a cost to which a firm is precommitted for some limited period, either
because the firm has signed a contract to make the payments or because the firm has
already paid for some durable item (such as a machine or a factory) and cannot get its
mone back except by using that item to produce putput for some period of time." BAUMOL
& BLINDER, supra note 142, at 493. Less formally, a sunk cost may be considered one that
has already been made and cannot be recovered; for example, the performance of an actor
in a film, or the copyright for a song that is played during the film.
150 CAVES, supra note 141, at 3.
151 Id., at 5; see also MICROECONOMICS, supra note 9.
152 Ty, 292 F.3d at 517 (directly addresses economic benefit of general right to review and
quote).
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problem of assessing the value of experience goods-those which must be
experienced before a buyer can understand its value or appeal. 153 As Hal
Varian and Carl Shapiro demonstrate, there are many strategies that makers
of an information-good can deploy in order to overcome consumers'
unwillingness to buy an experience good they have not experienced.
1. Previewing/Browsing
When consumers can preview and browse works, they are far more
likely to purchase them than when the goods are essentially a black box.
Several publishers have responded to this phenomenon by making their
works available online for browsing. For example:
The National Academy of Sciences Press found that when they
posted the full text of book on the Web, the sales of those books
went up by a factor of three. Posting the material on the Web
allowed potential customers to preview the material, but anyone
who really wanted to read the book would download it. MIT
Press had a similar experience with monographs and online
journals. 154
Like a phonebook that identifies all the providers of services in a given
area, previewing and browsing services give customers some sense of what
is available and what they are buying. Major music retailers now brag that
one can sample nearly every CD on their shelves.
This model of owner-approved or owner-organized browsing works
well when consumers have a clear idea of what they are looking for. Given
the exponential expansion of literary, film, music, and software offerings,
this is not always the case. In such markets, retailers, "buffs" and others
with educated tastes or an interest in selling the work can be crucial to
solving collective action problems. Recently, Amazon announced a
revolutionary cataloging feature that allows site visitors to search for words
and phrases in all the pages of a digitized collection of approximately
100,000 books Amazon offers for sale:
The copyrights to these titles are spread among countless
owners. How was it possible to create a publicly accessible
database from material whose ownership is so tangled?
153 HAL VARIAN AND CARL SHAPIRO, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY 4 (1999); qf CAVES, supra note 141, at 3 (describing the particularly
acute "experience good" problem in the context of creative goods: "A creative product is
an 'experience good' like these, but the buyer's satisfaction will be a subjective reaction...
• The organizational problem is to deal with symmetrical ignorance, not asymmetrical
information [a problem widely addressed in economic literature].").
154 Hal. R. Varian, Marketsfor Information Goods (April 1998, revised October 16, 1998),
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/-hal/Papers/japan/index.html.
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Amazon's solution is audacious: The company simply denies it
has built an electronic library at all .... You can find the page
that responds to your query, read it on your screen, and browse a
few pages backward and forward. But you cannot download,
copy, or read the book from beginning to end. There is no way to
link directly to any page of a book. If you want to read an
extensive excerpt, you must turn to the physical volume --
which, of course, you can conveniently purchase from Amazon.
Users will be asked to give their credit card number before
looking at pages in the archive, and they won't be able to view
more than a few thousand pages per month, or more than 20
percent of any single book. 155
Amazon has both the market power and the savvy transactional lawyers to
avoid lawsuits over the service. However, other innovators have not been
so lucky. 156 Arriba Soft, the creator of an archive of internet images, has
been in litigation over its site with one holdout-an obscure landscape
photographer-for years. 157 Video Pipeline's archive of brief clips from
movies was effectively shut down by a recent district court opinion affirmed
by the Third Circuit. 158 The Arriba Soft panel took seriously the positive
effects of a previewing service on the market for intellectual property
previewed in it, while the Buena Vista panel effectively ruled that owners of
the previewed IP must consent to its (or any part of its) inclusion in any
database-extending the logic of Justice Blackmun's fourth factor
"analysis" into a per se rule against unauthorized uses with commercial
potential. 1
59
155 Gary Wolf, The Great Library ofAmazon, WIRED NEWS (Oct. 23, 2003),
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,60948-0.html.
156 Jeffrey R. Young, Author's Group Sues Google Over Library-Scanning Project, 52(6)
CHRON. HIGHER ED., at A38 (Sept. 30, 2005) ("'They're making a plainly commercial use'
of authors' works without their consent, said Paul Aiken, executive director of the Authors
Guild, in an interview. 'The whole purpose of copyright is to allow the authors to share in
the commercial value of the works."').
57 Search engines' dilemmas on the internet recall classic property law problems arising in
the context of "holdouts" in eminent domain disputes. See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining
Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DuKE L. J. 1, 30 (2004) ("Eminent
domain precludes individual landowners from holding out and preventing the government
from utilizing land that it needs to effectuate certain public policies.").
158 Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir.
2003).
"' Several cases recognize that general exposure to the copyrighted work might cause
increased demand for the original. Others explicitly recognize the promotional. Two
cases analyzing websites note that a direct reference/link to the location of the original
copyrighted work may increase demand for that work. More analytically:
GENERAL POSITIVE MARKET EFFECT EXAMPLE(S) FOUND IN:
General Exposure to the Copyrighted Work Might Cause Nunez, Sundeman, Allen
Increased Demand for the Original Princeton
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2. Reputation and Reviews
Varian also notes that many producers of information products
overcome the "experience good" problem by consistently providing an
excellent product, thus building a reputation for quality. 160 I've rarely seen
an issue of the New York Times without at least one interesting article, so I
continue buying it; weblogs like politicaltheory.info and aldaily.com have
also earned a spot in my "Favorites" directory by consistently pointing me
to new ideas or well-written articles. The power of reputation is even
stronger in movies and music, where established star performers (as well as
writers, producers, and even costumers) can command princely sums for
their services. Buyers of computer software are often afraid of purchasing
products from unknown companies, and are generally willing to pay a
premium in order to buy an established brand.
The law of intellectual property primarily responds to the
importance of reputation in "creative industries" by providing strong
trademark protection. Trademarks and trade dress can clearly designate the
source of products because their owners have a cause of action against
anyone who causes confusion of "dilutes" the mark.
However, when we move beyond the field of source designation to
the protection of products themselves, adequate institutional signals of
reputation may also depend on owners' inability to strictly control all uses
of their work--particularly with respect to the rights afforded by copyright
protection. For example, book reviews would mean little if they could only
quote from a book after obtaining permission from the book's copyright
owner. I would rarely send articles from the New York Times website to
friends if I had to pay a fee each time I sent one. And it is likely that the
bloggers who now generate traffic for such sites would not do so if they
were not allowed to link to such sites. A restaurant guide unable to
reproduce photographs of restaurants would be much less valuable to
epicureans who also seek to know something of the ambiance of where they
will be dining.
Admittedly, in each of these cases it is difficult to assess the relative
contribution of each party to each party's economic success. Perhaps
bloggers like freerepublic.com or andrewsullivan.com are ultimately
parasites on established publications like the New York Times; or perhaps
they would command an audience even without such links and quotes and
Direct Reference/Link to the Location of the Original Kelly, Free Republic
Copyrighted Work
Unauthorized Use Advertises for the Original Video Pipeline, Antioch
160 Cf Richard Lethin, Reputation, in ANDY ORAM, PEER-TO-PEER: HARNESSING THE
BENEFITS OF A DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY (2001).
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the Times free-rides off the publicity they provide. It's hard to even
imagine a behavioral study that could settle questions like this. However, a
relationship of symbiosis or commensalisms is indisputable-both sides
benefit from a vital information ecology where journalists, bloggers,
reviewers, and established publications can freely quote, cite and link to
each to each other's work.
C. CONCLUSION: RECOGNIZING THE PREVALENCE OF
COMPLEMENTARITY IN COPYRIGHT'S COMMONS
Regardless of the net social benefit of fair use decisions, there is
growing evidence that the copyright-holders' efforts to expand the scope of
their control over their work is not only inefficient for the economy as a
whole, but also for the copyright-holders themselves. Like symbiosis and
parasitism in ecology, complementarity and competition pervade every
economic system. Courts should not permit overzealous efforts to stamp
out unauthorized uses of copyrighted works to blind them to its real
benefits.
Many copyright-holders are now trying to leverage public concern
"free-riding" pirates and downloaders into judicially or legislatively
mandated control over the value of all positive externalities arising from
their products. 161 As the story of the VCR demonstrates, 162 this strategy
may not only hurt society, but also prove self-defeating for the copyright-
holders themselves. 163 There is a broader lesson for fair use law generally.
161 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
103 1, 1039 (2005) (documenting "courts and scholars.., preoccupied with the problem of
"free riding."'). As Lemley explains, "If the goal of creating property rights is to equate
private and social costs and benefits by having the property owner internalize the social
costs and benefits, those who 'free ride'-obtain a benefit from someone else's
investment-are undermining the goals of the property system." Id. at 1039-40. Lemley
articulates a number of compelling reasons why law should not strive to internalize all
positive externalities of intellectual property to its owner. Id. at 1048 ("If I plant beautiful
flowers in my front lawn, I don't capture the full benefit of those flowers--passers-by can
enjoy them too. But property law doesn't give me a right to track them down and charge
them for the privilege, though owners of property once tried unsuccessfully to obtain such
a right.").
162 The VCR ultimately opened up huge new markets for copyright-holders, while only
negligibly decreasing sales in some extant markets. See S.J. Liebowitz, The Economics of
Betamax: Unauthorized Copying of Advertising Based Television Broadcasts,
http://www.utdallas.edu/-iebowit/intprop/betamax.pdf, at 18 (concluding that the "net
impact of VCR's" is ultimately negligible, and therefore "VCR use should be considered
an exception to copyright infringement since no diminution of creative activity is likely to
follow from VCR use and users would clearly benefit.").
163 Reviewing struggles between copyright-holders and developers of new technologies,
William Fisher observed "It is noteworthy that the story with the happiest ending -- both
for the public and for the copyright owners -- was the one in which the owners were denied
any share in the revenues earned by the developers of the new technology but instead had
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Even where positive effects fail to outweigh negative effects, explicit
consideration of them would at least force courts to recognize the ambiguity
inherent in the fair use determination and the necessarily speculative
character of the enterprise. 1
64
IV. VALUATION OF COPYRIGHT'S COMMONS: LESSONS FROM
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS
Despite the compelling economic evidence for the complementarity
of various unauthorized uses of copyrighted work, courts are likely to resist
considering the full range of these effects in fair use cases. Most judges are
not experts on the valuation of intellectual property. However, as Sony,
Kelly, and Sega have demonstrated, courts are capable of a careful analysis
of the overall effect of a contested use on the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.
Therefore, critical IP scholars can hope for judicial accounting of the
long-term positive effects of fair uses, so long as they can overcome
difficulties in the valuation of such uses, compared with more traditional,
market based assessments of the value of intellectual property. 165 Owners
of copyrights can often demonstrate immediate substitution effects and
revenue losses resulting from a new use of their works. How are courts to
balance such costs against more diffuse and longer-term benefits?
Environmental lawyers and economists have long faced similar
problems of proof. For example, zoning commissions must often weigh an
immediate, profitable conversion of a common resource to private
ownership against the longer-term benefits continued open access would
offer. 166 An intellectual commons shares many important qualities with the
tangible commons up for grabs during such determinations. 167  By and
large, any one person's use of a "real-space" commons does not inhibit
others' use of it-and indeed may enhance the value of the commons to
others. 168 Similarly, I am not preventing anyone from playing a song if I
to develop a new business model to take advantage of it (VCR's)." William Fisher, Don't
Beat Them, Join Them, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2004, at A. 23.
164 Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects,
86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998).
165 See Wagner, The Keepers of the Gates, supra note 134, at 1116 n.28, 1080 n.174
(discussing Calabresi and Melamed's treatment of valuation difficulties in their classic
work on liability rules, and Epstein's and Merges's subsequent treatment of valuation
difficulties as a serious impediment to practical liability rules).
166 Imagine, for example, a proposal to turn part of Central Park into housing.
167 Douglas Noonan, Internet Decentralization, Feedback, and Self-Organization, in JOHN
A. BADEN AND DOUGLAS S. NOONAN, MANAGING THE COMMONS 188 (2d ed. 1998); James
Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87
(1997).
168 Cf ROSE, Comedy of the Commons, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 141-
43 (noting how dances and festivals increase in value the more individuals participate, and
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happen to copy it, store it, and play it on my personal computer. Indeed, the
very fact that I play the song (and, say, recommend it to others) may
enhance its value, given the demand that may be created by other fans who
now want to hear it.169
The parallel between real- and cyber-space commons has not been
lost on property scholars. Carol Rose observes that "both cyberspace and
environmentalism bring into relief . . the difficulty we often have in
recognizing the value, or even the existence, of the limited commons, the
resource management practices that are 'commons' among the insiders but
exclusive with respect to outsiders."' 170  Rose's article raises some
fascinating parallels in the development of cyberspace and environmental
law; however, hers is a project more of reflection than of reform, and she
does not try to draw explicit lessons from one area of the law for the
other
17 1
A few scholars have begun to draw lessons from environmental law
for IP law. James Boyle argues that critical IP scholars need to learn the
following lessons from environmentalists:
Right now, it seems to me that, in a number of respects, we are at
the stage that the American environmental movement was at in the
1950s or 1960s. At that time, there were people - supporters of the
commenting on how "the publicness of commerce-the increasing returns from greater
participation- .., created the value of any roadway or waterway).
169 Of course, one must acknowledge the reverse, snob effect: individuals often feel
superior when they are part of a tight-knit cognoscenti. See, e.g., THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE
THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 95 (Transaction Publishers 1992; originally published in
1899); DAVID BROOKS, BOBOS IN PARADISE (2001); Henry Leibenstein, Bandwagon, Snob,
and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers'Demand, 64 Q.J. ECON. 183, 189 (1950).
10 Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales,
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 181 (1998). Surveying
developments in both areas of property law, Rose concludes that "cyberspace and
environmentalist critics of property implicitly point our attention to some unexpected costs
of property. In particular, they point out that the course of propertization may be partial and
uneven and that the distortions from partial propertization may be both destructive of
resources and distributionally unfair, producing strife and rancor rather than peace and
productiveness." Id. at 180.
171 Scholars intent on reform in this area usually try to use the tools of IP law to advance
environmental protection. For example, Michael Gollin argues that granting companies IP
rights in innovations they develop in order to comply with anti-pollution will allow
"leaders" in this area to gain a competitive advantage via environmental protection.
Michael A. Gollin, Using Intellectual Property To Improve Environmental Protection, 4
HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 193 (1999). The Rio Convention on Biodiversity grants developing
countries IP rights in indigenous species and knowledge, in the hope that protection of
these resources will become economically viable once their stewards are better able to
capture their value. See, e.g., Sarah A. Laird, Contracts for Biodiversity Prospecting, in
WALTER V. REID ET AL., BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING: USING GENETIC RESOURCES FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 99 (1993); Michael A. Gollin, An Intellectual Properly
Rights Frameworkfor Biodiversity Prospecting, in REID ET AL., supra this note, at 159.
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park system, hunters, birdwatchers and so on - who cared about
what we would now identify as "environmental" issues. In the
world of intellectual property we now have start-up software
engineers, libraries, appropriationist artists, parodists, biographers,
biotech researchers, and others. In the 1950s, there were flurries of
outrage over particular environmental crises, such as proposals to
build dams in national parks. In later years, the public was shocked
by burning rivers and oil spills. In the world of intellectual
property, we currently worry about Microsoft's allegedly anti-
competitive practices, the uncertain ethics of patenting human
genes, and the propriety of using copyright to silence critics of the
Church of Scientology. We are notably lacking two things,
however. The first is a theoretical framework, a set of analytical
tools with which issues should be analyzed. The second is a
perception of common interest among apparently disparate groups,
a common interest which cuts across traditional oppositions.
7 2
Boyle argues that two central ideas of environmental law united disparate
actors into a coherent movement: "ecology; the study of the fragile,
complex and unpredictable interconnections between living systems," and
"welfare economics, which revealed the ways in which markets can fail to
make economic actors internalize the full costs of their actions.' 73
Following on the latter point, I am going to propose in Part V below the use
of some specific tools of environmental law-specifically, the economic
valuation of biodiversity-to help standardize and systematize "effect on
the market" analysis.
Economic analysis became pivotal to advocates of biodiversity in
the 1980s. These activists had succeeded in passing laws like the Marine
Mammals Protection Act (MMPA) and the Endangered Species Act in the
early 1970's, only to see the first pass into near desuetude in the early 1980s
and desultory enforcement by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service nearly
scuttle the second. Though successful in some key legal battles,
174
endangered species advocates were losing regulatory and political conflicts
to forces that portrayed the cost of biodiversity protection as outrageously
high. 175
In response to political battles over ESA reauthorization and other
172 Boyle, supra note 10, at 108.
173 Id. at 108-09.
174 TVA v. Hill, 437 US 153 (1978); see generally Lavonne Dye, The Marine Mammal
Protection Act: Maintaining the Commitment to Marine Mammal Conservation, 43 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1411 (1993).
175 CHARLES MANN AND MARK L. PLUMMER, NOAH's CHOICE: THE FUTURE OF
ENDANGERED SPECIES (1995); RICHARD TOBIN, THE EXPENDABLE FUTURE: U.S. POLITICS
AND THE PROTECTION OF BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 204-05 (1990) (discussing lobbying by
the American Mining Congress and the National Forest Products Association in the late
1970s which advanced 1978 Amendments to the ESA which considerably complicated the
process of listing particular species).
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environmental laws, advocates of biodiversity continued to emphasize the
noneconomic value of species protection-including, for example,
religious, moral and aesthetic arguments. 176 However, advocates also began
to develop more sophisticated economic justifications for preserving species
and accompanying habitats. Confronting proponents of "wise use" on their
own terms, advocates of preserving the natural commons of species
emphasized the hidden value of "nonextractive" resource use (such as
tourism and recreation) and "ecosystem services" (such as wetlands' natural
capacity to dilute and treat pollution). Although such estimates have been
contested vigorously, they do demonstrate that there are costs to the
depletion of the natural commons of biodiversity perhaps as great (or
greater) than the costs of protecting it.
As I will discuss in the following sections, I think it is time for
critical IP scholars to start developing an account of the costs of
overprotection of IP (and under-preservation of an IP commons) analogous
to the typology of costs and benefits developed by environmental
economists in order to reflect the true value of biodiversity and habitat
protection. Scholars investigating the valuation of biological diversity have
begun to quantify the contributions to human welfare of a vast, diffuse, and
unorganized commons increasingly impinged on by claims of ownership
and development. 177 Pitched at the proper level of abstraction, this project
offers several important lessons for IP scholars.
A. VALUATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS
The full economic value of biological resources is often not
reflected in commodity markets. For example, a tiger may be hunted and
sold for meat for, say, $100, but if left alone could have attracted tourists to
an area who would have spent many times that for a chance to see it.178 A
176 See, e.g., Bruce Babbitt, Between the Flood and the Rainbow: Our Covenant to Protect
the Whole of Creation, 2 ANIMAL LAW 1 (1996) (advancing theologically based duties to
environmental stewardship); STEVEN WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS
FOR ANIMALS (2000); BRYAN G. NORTON, WHY PRESERVE NATURAL VARIETY? 5-15
(1987) (surveying anthropocentric, nonanthropocentric, aesthetic, and "transformative"
justifications for preserving biodiversity).
177 See J. B. Ruhl, Toward a Common Law of Ecosystem Services, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
1, 11 (2005) (commenting on "the emergence of a branch of ecosystem management
focused on the economic value humans derive not from natural resource commodities such
as timber, or from recreational uses, but from ecosystem functions such as flood control,
pollination, thermal regulation, and storm surge mitigation--what ecologists today call
ecosystem services.").
178 See, e.g, S. Navrud and S. Mungatana, Environmental valuation in developing
countries: The recreational value of wildlife viewing, 11 ECOL. EcoN. 135 (1994)
(estimating the annual value of ecotourism in Lake Nakuru National Park in Kenya to be
between seven and fifteen million U.S. dollars). A good sampling of such scholarship
appears at the online syllabus for the course Environmental Quality and the Economy in the
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rare cone snail may be killed for its decorative shell for a few hundred
dollars, but if it and all the rest of its species are used in this way, scientists
may never be able to explore whether it contains pain-alleviating chemicals
worth millions of dollars to the pharmaceutical industry. 179 New York City
recently determined that an undeveloped area of the Catskills could perform
"ecosystem services" in water supply and treatment that would cost several
times more if supplied artificially. 1
80
Although such anecdotes have long been marshaled by advocates of
environmental protection, systematic classification of the economic value of
biodiversity has only developed in the past two decades. Inspired by a
growing social and academic movement for the preservation of biodiversity,
several environmental economists and lawyers have tried to quantify the
market failures and externalities that fail to reflect the true value of
environmental goods and services. 181 Several recent efforts in this regard
have systematically identified these values.
Environmental asset valuation has classically been divided into two
categories: Use Value (UV) plus Nonuse Value (NUV). Together, UV plus
NUV equals Total Economic Value (TEV). 182  As David Pearce and
Dominic Moran explain, a use value is "value arising from an actual use
made of a given resource[; e.g.,] the use of a forest for timber, or of a
wetland for recreation or fishing."'183 This is all very intuitive; however, as
Pearce and Moran explain, Use Value itself must be multifaceted if it is to
fully reflect not only present and known but also future and unknown uses
of a resource:
Use values are further divided into direct use values (DUV), which
refer to actual uses such as fishing, timber extraction, etc.; indirect
use values (IUV), which refer to the benefits deriving from
ecosystem functions such as a forest's function in protecting the
watershed; and option values (OV), which . . . approximate[] an
individual's willingness to pay to safeguard an asset for the option
of using it at a later date.
Nonuse values include Bequest Value (BV), "the benefit accruing to any
Mexican Carribean, Washington and Lee University, Spring 2005,
http://home.wlu.edu/-caseyj/AppendixA.htm1.
179 Callum Roberts, Letter, SCIENCE, Oct. 17, 2003 (explaining the potential benefits of
endangered cone snails).
180 Earthbeat, Putting the Right Price on Nature,
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/science/earth/stories/s365476.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2006).
181 See, e.g., Christopher D. Stone, What To Do About Biodiversity: Property Rights, Public
Goods, and the Earth's Biological Riches, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 577 (1995) (discussing
positive and negative externalities of habitat conservation and destruction).
182 PEARCE AND MORAN, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF BIODIVERSITY 19 (1995).
183 Id.
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individual from knowledge that others might benefit from a resource in the
future," and Existence Value (XV), which derives simply from individuals'
awareness that a given aspect of the living environment still exists.
TEV = UV + NUV
TEV = (DUV + IUV + OV) + (XV + BV)
Given controversies over nonuse values' translation into political and
economic terms, I will not discuss them further in this paper. 184 However,
following on this framework, I will briefly discuss economists' efforts to
flesh out in more detail each of the three components of Use Value featured
in the equation above.
1. Direct Use Value (DUV)
There are three categories of "direct use" of biodiversity:
consumptive, productive, and non-consumptive. 18  Consumptive uses
transform the physical biomass of life forms into food, fuel, fodder,
construction materials, et al. for direct use by human beings. Productive
uses encompass the "value-added" incorporation of natural materials into
more complex goods and services. Non-consumptive uses cover all the
"uses" of biodiversity that do not necessarily extract parts of the ecosystem
for human use, such as tourism, research, education, and entertainment.
2. Indirect Use Value (IUV)
Undisturbed wetlands provide a great deal of watershed protection,
including erosion control, local flood control, and stream flow
modulation. 186  Benign ecological processes include nutrient fixing, soil
formation, and cycling of water and basic elements like carbon."8 7 A now-
famous article in Nature in 1997 estimated the value of such ecosystem
114 See, e.g., D Rosenthal and R. Nelson, Why Existence Values Should Not be Used in
Cost-Benefit Analysis, II J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGM'T 116 (1992); National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990: PROPOSED REGULATIONS FOR
NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS, U.S. Dep't of Commerce (1994); R. DAVID
SIMPSON, THE PRICE OF BIODIVERSITY, ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 1999; R.
David Simpson, Roger A. Sedjo, and John W. Reid, Valuing Biodiversity for Use in
Pharmaceutical Research, 104 J. POL. ECON. 163 (1985).
115 K. Ravi and P. Pushpangadan, Application of Environmental Valuation Technics for
Economic Evaluation of Biodiversity: A Critical Investigation, in K. RAVI ET AL.,
CONSERVATION AND THE ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF BIODIVERSITY 347 (1997).
186 John MacArthur, The Economic Valuation of Biodiversity, its Implications and
Importance in Bioreseoure Planning, and Initiatives for its Regular Use in Planning
Conservation Projects in India, in 2 K. RAVI ET AL., CONSERVATION AND THE ECONOMIC
EVALUATION OF BIODIVERSITY 347 (1997).
187 Id.
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services at somewhere between $16 to 54 trillion annually. 188 Focusing on
local ecosystems, many ecologists have chronicled the costs to many
communities of failing to protect cleansing ecosystem processes. 189 While
anecdotal evidence of terrible "domino" effects from ecosystem disturbance
has long been available, 190 scholars have now begun to quantify the precise
costs of neglecting or overdeveloping land and marine resources.
191
3. Option Value
Although it is by far the most controversial of the "direct use" values
mentioned above, option value has been explored by a number of scholars.
Successes in bioprospecting in recent years (such as the development of
anti-cancer agent Tamoxifen from rare yew trees and important lab tests
from horseshoe crab blood) have demonstrated the value of nature's library
of genetic material. 192 Less practically (but perhaps more importantly), the
preservation of biodiversity has enormous spiritual and moral importance
for many environmentalists. Although it is perhaps inappropriate to try to
quantify this value, new economic approaches (such as hedonic pricing and
contingent valuation) may help economists assess value of these potential or
intangible benefits.
B. MEASURING DIRECT AND INDIRECT USE VALUES, AND OPTION VALUES
As the above discussion indicates, virtually any particular feature of
the natural environment has several types of current and potential economic
value. 193 Given that many of these values redound socially (and not simply
188 R. Costanza et al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital,
387 NATURE 253 (1997).
"9 James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 Ecol. L. Q. 887, 888 (1997) (reviwing
NATURE'S SERVICES, SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS (Gretchen C.
Daily ed., 1997), and commenting that "only recently have ecologists and economists
begun systematically examining the contribution of ecosystem services to social welfare.").
190 See, e.g, E.O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 308-9 (1992) (discussing case study of
the Nile Perch, and showing how the removal of one species "risk[s] a downward spiral of
the larger assemblage").
191 See, e.g., Sandra Postrel and Stephen Carpenter, Freshwater Ecosystem Services, in
NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 195 (Gretchen C.
Daily ed., 1997).
19' See Christopher Hunter, Comment, Sustainable Bioprospecting: Using Private
Contracts and International Legal Principles and Policies to Conserve Raw -Medicinal
J1aterials, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 129, 164-65 (1997).
193 See, e.g, Brian Binger et al., The Use of Contingent Valuation Methodology in Natural
Resource Damage Assessments: Legal Fact and Economic Fiction, 89 Nw. U. L. REV.
1029 (1995); Frank B. Croos, Natural Resource Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REV. 269 (1989);
David A. McKay, CERCLA's Natural Resource Damage Provisions: A Comprehensive and
Innovative Approach to Protecting the Environment, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1417
(1988).
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to the owner of the environmental good), we should not expect the market
price of environmental goods to fully reflect their social benefit. But how
do we fully estimate such social benefits in the absence of a functioning
market for them? Environmental economists have proposed several
potential measures, based on a long history of economic efforts to price the
priceless. 194
As Pearce and Moran explain, there are direct and indirect
approaches to valuation. Direct approaches "attempt[] to elicit preferences
directly by the use of survey and experimental techniques, such as the
contingent valuation and contingent ranking methods."' 195 By contrast,
"indirect approaches are those techniques which seek to elicit preferences
from actual, observed market-based information."'196 Economists also try to
triangulate to a reasonable figure by getting several different estimates of
the value of a particular resource; for example, in the case of medicinal
plants, one might assess "the actual market value of the plants when traded,
the market value of the drugs of which they are the source material, and the
value of the drugs in terms of their life-saving properties, and using the
value of a 'statistical life'."1 97 Several approaches to indirect valuation have
been developed by environmental economists. 198  "Surrogate market
techniques involve looking at markets for private goods and services which
194 Jeffrey C. Dobbins, The Pain and Suffering of Environmental Loss: Using Contingent
Valuation to Estimate Nonuse Damages, 43 DuKE L.J. 879, 898-901 (1994) (discussing
individuals' valuations based on use); Don L. Coursey, The Revealed Demand For a Public
Good: Evidence From Endangered and Threatened Species, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 411
(1998).
195 Pearce and Moran give the following account of contingent valuation:
1) A hypothetical description (scenario) of the terms under which
the good or service is to be offered is presented to the respondent.
2) The respondent is asked questions to determine how much he
would value a good or service if confronted with the opportunity to
obtain it under the specified terms and conditions. These questions
take the form of asking how much an individual is willing to pay or
willing to accept for some change in provision.
3) Response validity is tested by relating "willingness to pay" or
"willingness to accept" responses to respondent socioeconomic and
demographic characteristics. Confirmation of a priori expectations
of the relationship between willingness to pay/accept and income,
age, and other variables is a good indicator of meaningful responses.
PEARCE AND MORAN, supra note 182, at 60.
196 Id at 49.
197 PEARCE AND MORAN, supra note 182, at 105.
198 Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J.
ECON. LIT. 675, 703-710 (discussing the "averting behavior" approach, hedonic market
methods ("the notion that the price of a house or job can be decomposed into the prices of
the attributes that make up the good, such as air quality"), wage-amenity studies, hedonic
labor markets, and hedonic travel costs).
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are related to the environmental commodities of concern"-for example, the
market for travel in the case of ecotourism. 199 The hedonic pricing method
attempts to disaggregate the value of amenities, like air and light, from the
price of properties. 200  Although such methods are subject to biases and
distortions, sophisticated regression analyses can improve the reliability of
the results.
C. THE VALUE OF TAXONOMIZING VALUE
The valuation of environmental resources like biodiversity is a
difficult and contestable process. Courts have not uniformly accepted
concepts like "option value" and "indirect value." 20 1 However, the work of
Pearce, Moran, and other researchers is highly valuable to scholars of
physical and intangible commons. First, these economists help us replace
rival anecdotes with systematic analysis of the costs and benefits of
different courses of action. By taxonomizing the value of common-pool
resources, they bring to light the full range of options foreclosed by
biodiversity loss. When copyright litigation threatens the fate of new
information ecologies (such as those enabled by P2P networks), a full
accounting of the value of the use-and particularly its potential value to
the very copyrightholder bringing suit-is in order. Environmental
economics suggests some new ways of organizing the inquiry.
199 Again, Pearce and Moran provide a straightforward explanation of the method:
[A] travel cost approach uses observed expenditures on the travel to
recreational sites to estimate the benefit arising from recreational
experience.. .many recreation sites charge a zero or negligible price which
means that it is not possible to estimate demand in the usual way.
However, by looking at how different people respond to differences in
money travel cost (including transport, admission, an the value of time,
etc) we can infer how they might respond to changes in entry price.
PEARCE AND MORAN, supra note 182, at 67.
200 In the hedonic pricing method, "an attempt is made to estimate an implicit price for
environmental attributes by looking at real markets in which these characteristics are
effectively traded. Thus, 'clean air' and 'peace and quiet' are effectively traded in the
property market since purchasers of houses and land do consider these environmental
dimensions as characteristics of property." PEARCE AND MORAN, supra note 182, at 67.
201 Biodiversity valuation was recently at issue in two appellate opinions rejecting
commerce clause challenges to intrastate regulation of endangered species. GDF Realty
Investments, Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 638 (2003) ("[T]he possibility of future
substantial effects of the Cave Species on interstate commerce, through industries such as
medicine, is simply too hypothetical and attenuated from the regulation in question to pass
constitutional muster."); Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
("the commercial value of preserving species diversity played an important role in
Congress' deliberations").
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
V. TOWARD MORE RIGOROUS EFFECT ON THE MARKET ANALYSIS
A. MATCHING THE NEEDS OF EFFECT ON THE MARKET ANALYSIS WITH
THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF BIODIVERSITY VALUATION
Imagine each of the following situations:
* Enticed by content of the Los Angeles Times reprinted online, I
decide to buy the print version of the Sunday paper.202
" Budget-pressed directors of job training programs pirate copies of
Microsoft Word in order to train their students how to use the
software. As labor capable of operating the software becomes more
plentiful, more companies begin to use Microsoft Word.2 °3
* A college student who has downloaded hundreds of MP3 files from
the internet decides to buy an Apple I-Pod to make them portable.
Determined to fill up the machine to its 15,000 song capacity, the
student later buys dozens of CD's once she has a job.
Each scenario illuminates the complex, socially conditioned economy (and
ecology) of ideas. Each suggests that uses copyrightholders want to
proscribe can ultimately redound to their benefit. Yet how is a court
supposed to take such uses into account?
As demonstrated previously, judicial fair use analyses have too often
ignored the long-term positive effects of new technologies on
copyrightholders, as well as the complementary products and network
effects generated by such technologies. The chart below suggests that
scholars of biodiversity valuation have confronted similar problems in their
own field:
202 Cf L.A. Times v. Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (stating that
online market for plaintiff newspapers' articles was harmed because plaintiffs demonstrated
that "[defendants] are attempting to exploit the market for viewing their articles online").
203 As James Boyle suggests, network effects can be immensely profitable for a firm, but
raise some important policy concerns:
Are the losses to Microsoft from the increased ease with which Word
could be pirated, greater or lesser than the benefits they get from
network effects? We do not know the answer. What will be the effects
on innovation of this increase in the importance of network effects?
Does it argue for greater intellectual property protection or, to the
contrary, a removal of protection from any protocol around which
standardization could occur? Again, the issue is an extraordinarily
complex one.
Boyle, Mean, Cruel, or Lavish, supra note 4, at 2017.
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In the section below, I attempt to demonstrate how such
comprehensive analysis of long-term, complementary and network "effects
on the market" could enhance the rigor of upcoming judicial decisions on
fair use defenses in cases involving P2P technologies.
B. LONGER TIME HORIZONS
By emphasizing the "option value" of biodiversity, environmental
economists have helped concretize the hidden worth of commons
resources-a worth that may only emerge with the aid of more intense
bioprospecting or better search technologies. The value of communication
and information technology is also contingent on a wide array of societal
developments. As Shapiro and Varian demonstrate, most new information
industries face a long development time, when only a few people use the
technology, and then suddenly grow exponentially when a critical mass of
Shortcoming of Complementary
"Effect on the Achievement of
Market Analysis" in Scholarship in Biodiversity
Fair Use Valuation
Time Horizon Too often undervalues Sets "option" and "bequest"
long-term Pareto- values on biodiversity as raw
optimal impact of material for future
disruptive exploitation.
technologies.
Complementary Unwilling to Inquires into the value of
Products systematically explore wilderness complementing
benefits to content adjoining, developed land.
owners of products
which complement
their work.
Network Effects Ignores how a network Accounts for the value of
of fair uses may make ecosystem services
parallel paid uses supporting productive
more likely, economic activity; details
"domino" effects of
eliminating a common
biodiversity resource;
Explores the full range of
interconnections of
ecosystems.
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users is reached and network effects kick in.20 4 Email was developed in the
1970s, but only took off in the 1990s as more and more people joined the
network. Napster and similar P2P technologies may well have jump-started
the development of network effects in digital music distribution. Just as a
grace period from licensing fees aided the infant industry of radio in the
early twentieth century, 20 5 unsettled copyright laws permitted this new
technology to convince millions to spend time on the web finding and
listening to music. If P2P succeeds in building new communities of interest
in music, such communities may whet consumer appetites for paid uses of
copyrighted content.
206
It is also important not to assume that the most prevalent initial use of a
new technology will forever be its dominant use. Though primarily of
interest to consumers now, P2P software has many potential business
applications. Major players in the computer industry have begun to explore
its potential:
Sun Microsystems [has] created an infrastructure called Project
JXTA, which allows programmers to use a common library when
creating new P2P applications. By providing a robust, secure,
interoperable applications programming interface (API), Project
JXTA hopes to attract new audiences to P2P technologies,
including businesses. As most of the groundwork is completed, it
would take far fewer resources for a business interested in P2P to
get started using Project JXTA than starting from scratch. 20 7
The latter point-on the "snowball" effect of developing applications-
suggests the importance of network effects in software development.
C. NETWORK EFFECTS: A READYMADE DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
Many P2P services permit the self-organization of groups devoted to
sampling and evaluating music. P2P promises to generate peer-based
exchange systems, which can generate an interactive listening community.
204 CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES (1999), available at
http://www.inforules.com/.
205 See Lessig's treatment of radio in LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF
CYBERSPACE (1999); for a treatment more sympathetic to copyrightholders, see PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX
(1995).
201 Compare, for example, the role of free Lexis/Westlaw access in law school in
generating lawyers' taste for (dependence on?) these services; or the role of "used books"
in potentially developing appetites for new ones. See Rob Walker, Paperback Music, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2001, (Magazine) at 17 (proposing a two-tiered approach in which the CD
would co-exist along with lower quality downloads).
207 Matthew Gibbs, Hill Associates, Peer to Peer: Past, Present, Future (2003),
http://www.hill.com/archive/pub/papers/papers.asp?yr-2003&mn-03.
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This practice reflects the communal innovation that led to the development
of the Internet itself. In keeping with the nature of the Internet, P2P
services generate taste through interactivity. Other users act as filters and
bellwethers, potentially catalyzing mutual tastes. With the exponential
increase in the production of information, services of customization,
personalization, mediation, filtering, and screening are going to become
increasingly important. At the same time, the underlying interaction
between users is an integral part of the network and the P2P protocol's
efficiency - individuals sharing with one another in a connected
environment benefit from the positive externalities of "network effects."
Content-owners will have many new ways of marketing and distributing
their works in such an atmosphere.
They might also find that more widespread fair use can lead to a
"bigger pie" of innovation and creation for all concerned. The West Coast's
decided advantage over Boston area businesses in internet innovation is in
part explained by the greater prevalence of informal sharing in Silicon
Valley. A leading scholar
attributes much of the Silicon Valley's success to a culture
that promotes informal sharing of technical know-how,
amidst intense competition, among the many small firms
that populate the area. In contrast, the staid, larger, and
more vertically integrated, firms located in the Route 128
region near Boston prefer traditional self-reliance and
secrecy... [T]his difference between the two regions.., is
a major reason for Silicon Valley's phenomenal growth and
Route 128's relative stagnancy.
20 8
In general, high-volume/low-margin business models that focus on
maximizing paid uses (as opposed to low-volume/high-margin models that
focus on minimizing unpaid uses) may prove most beneficial to both
consumers and producers.
D. COMPLEMENTARY USES: ADVERTISING AND EXPOSURE
Nearly all intellectual property is both raw material and finished
product (such that increasing its price does not simply increase incentives
for creating finished goods, but also increases the cost of future finished
goods).20 9 This dual nature of such goods is even more evident in the case
208 Marina Lao, Unilateral Refusals to Sell or License Intellectual Property and the
Antitrust Duty to Deal, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 193, 216 (1999) (describing the
conclusions of ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION
IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE (1996)).
209 JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
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of music. Experiences of listening to music are not only integral to its
creation (production), but also to its enjoyment (consumption). As Aristotle
noted centuries ago, we are creatures of habit. Whenever we listen to
music, we further etch this activity into the groove of habit.210 So Napster
does not simply steal sales from RIAA members-it exposes potential
customers to their products, cultivating tastes as surely as advertising or
radio air play.
What is the economic upshot of this holistic view of the P2P
phenomenon? Think again of the radio and advertising analogy. Owners of
recordings pay for advertising, and are paid for digital webcasts. Napster
falls between the two. Web-based radio station owners pay collective rights
organizations for licensing because their own gains from advertising are
attributable to the content, and in order to compensate content owners for
possible piracy.211 An MP3 obtained via Napster is more likely to substitute
for a legitimately purchased CD than a radio performance, since it's of
higher quality and far easier to find. But Napster and similar file sharing
services have also done the recording industry an invaluable service-they
have acclimated millions of individuals to the idea of searching for and
enjoying music on the web, and have catalyzed a new responsiveness to
consumer demands that may ultimately prove very profitable to the
industry. This potential market, largely opened by Napster, certainly
promises to expand their business more than any advertising campaign
could.2 12  By complementing traditional market-based proprietary
distribution and control, P2P's promise stems from its ability reduce the cost
of drawing information out of and inputting information back into the
THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 42 (1996).
210 G.A. COHEN, IF YOU'RE AN EGALITARIAN, HOw COME YOU'RE So RICH? (2000)
(critiquing Rawls' identification of the "basic structure" as the subject of a theory of justice
due to its failure to account for the importance of ingrained habits and dispositions); PETER
BERKOWITZ, VIRTUE AND THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM (1999) (discussing
Aristotle on habit); but see JON ELSTER, POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 180-91 (1993) (on
spillover, compensation, and crowding-out effects).
211 "Brick and mortar" radio stations only pay royalties to composers, lyricists, and their
publishers; however, internet "streaming" radio stations pay these royalties and royalties to
performers and their recording companies under the Digital Performance Rights in Sound
Recordings Act ("DPRA") of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, § 1, 109 Stat. 336 (1995). Details
on the digital royalty payment process are available at SoundExchange. SoundExchange,
About Us, http://www.soundexchange.com/about/about.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2006).
212 I would cite some excellent work by McKinsey, Jupiter, and Forrester consultancies
here, but it's nearly all proprietary. See, e.g., McKinsey's study "Unchained Melody,"
available (for a price) at
http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/article-abstract.asp?ar-978&L2-17&L3 66&srid-86
&gp-0 (claiming that "[a] new model of music distribution-a subscription-based
"jukebox in the sky" that delivers an unlimited choice of music-could double the size of
the industry, to $80 billion a year, potentially giving incumbents a piece of a much larger
pie."). As limited access to this material suggests, intellectual property protections
themselves can sometimes hinder efforts to ascertain their proper scope.
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network.
Of course, the sum total of these network, complementarity, and
long-term effects may not outweigh the negative, substitution effects
enabled by Napster's service. However, incorporating systematic inquiry
into the positive effects of new technologies on content owners would
enable courts to more fairly assess their effect on the market for copyrighted
works. Just as environmental economists have focused our attention on the
quantifiable value of the tangible commons of biodiversity, "fair use"
defenses need to start incorporating systematic accounts of the potential
value of new technologies to copyrightholders. 2 13 If courts start taking such
effect on the market analysis more seriously, they will not only evaluate
new uses' effect on the value of copyrighted works more accurately, but
also may shift P2P networks away from the socially deleterious (but legally
effective) strategy of avoiding liability by refusing to monitor or service
their networks.
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VI. CONCLUSION: A PLEA FOR TAXONOMY
The legal rules governing copyrights may not seem terribly
significant to the casual observer. Who cares if consumers or producers of
entertainment products get a slightly greater or lesser share of the new
profits generated by digitized distribution? Yet as more and more vital
information is distributed digitally, these rules will increasingly affect our
culture and politics. Furthermore, as "smart appliances" and other
manufactured equipment incorporates more and more copyrighted software,
the rules governing fair use will crucially shape the economy.
Consider the story of Ed Swartz, whose company Static Control
recycles printer cartridges. Lexmark, a leading manufacturer of the
cartridges, sued Static Control for copying 56 bytes (a trivial amount) of the
code in computer chips in Lexmark cartridges that enables communication
between the cartridge and the printer.2 1 An adverse ruling would
essentially put Static Control out of business, with potentially baleful effects
on competition generally:
Should his company lose in court, Swartz envisions a world of
monopolies that would make turn-of-the-century Standard Oil
213 See RISHAB AIYER GHOSH, CODE (forthcoming, 2006) (arguing that "'open source'
creative collaboration provides an alternative to commercially-driven policies determining
intellectual property rights," and suggesting ways of valuing "free" software in terms of the
avoidance of licensing fees for proprietary alternatives.).
214 See, e.g., Fred von Lohmann, What Peer-to-Peer Developers Need to Know about
Copyright Law (Jan. 2006), http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/p2p copyright wp.php
("Accordingly, in order to avoid vicarious liability, a P2P developer would be wise to
choose an architecture that makes control over end-user activities impossible.").
215 Frank Ahrens, Caught by the Act: Digital Copyright Law Ensnaring Businesses,
Individuals over Fair Use, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2003, at El.
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blush. He predicts deals between automakers and tiremakers, for
instance, that would put copyright-protected chips in tires to
prevent a car from starting unless it was fitted with automaker-
approved tires. Imagine, for instance, if Toyotas would run only
on Goodyear tires, he said. What would become of Michelin,
Cooper, Pirelli and other tiremakers?
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As IP owners increasingly use their rights to leverage market power over
one product into dominance in the market for complementary goods, fair
use determinations may be crucial to the preservation of competition.
Copyright policymakers-in both Congress and the Copyright Office-
should become more sensitive to the role of fair use in the creation of (and
competition in) new markets.
Yet even if they don't, courts can still take into account the
economically beneficial effects of fair use by factoring them into the "effect
on the market" analysis. Admittedly, any judge's determination that a
litigated use actually has a positive effect on the market for a copyrighted
product 217 will amount to a judicial determination that the IPR-holder does
not know what is good for him.218 Such a paternalistic determination would
be suspect, but for the long history of content-owners trying to stifle
innovations that ultimately proved nearly Pareto-optimal-good for all
major stakeholders concerned. 219  Even Motion Picture Association of
America President Jack Valenti-who once deemed the VCR the
technological equivalent of the "Boston Strangler"220 -would have to agree
that its impact on the entertainment industry was ultimately benign.
22 1
216 Id. Of course, it is unlikely that most consumers would buy such a car. But
oligopolistic industries may reach a consensus on such standards that essentially eliminates
consumer choice in the matter. Had it continued, the Secure Digital Music Initiative could
have pioneered such methods of coordination. See Nichelle Levy, Method to Their
Madness: The Secure Digital Music Initiative, A Law and Economics Perspective, 5 VA.
J.L. & TECH. 12 (2000).
217 Or, so swamps negative effects as to make the fourth factor a "wash."
211 Or, more likely, it, given the virtual inevitability of corporate control of most litigated
intellectual property rights in our economy.
211 Copyrightholders have attempted to stop or control the spread of hardware ranging from
piano rolls to broadcast radio to the VCR. See Jane Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over
New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1642-45 (2001).
220 In 1981, commenting on the VCR, Valenti claimed that "the VCR is to the American
film producer and the American public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home
alone," and predicted that "We are going to bleed and bleed and hemorrhage, unless this
Congress at least protects one industry . . . whose total future depends on its protection
from the savagery and the ravages of this machine." Home Recordings of Copyrighted
Works: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration
of Justice of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1982) (statement of Jack
Valenti, President, Motion Picture Ass'n of Am.), available at http://cryptome.org/hrcw-
hear.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2006).
221 Richard Caves characterizes this potential for error as the classic "nobody knows"
problem of "creative industries": customers can't be sure they'll enjoy the product, and
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Copyright's fair use doctrine could be an effective method of
protecting such Pareto-optimal new technologies, particularly since its
fourth factor-effect on the market analysis-calls for judicial inquiry into
the potential effects of uses enabled by new technology. In cases
addressing technologies ranging from the photocopier to internet search
engines, courts have only occasionally addressed the contested use's
potentially positive effect on the market for the copyrighted work. This
paper proposes to systematize this inquiry in the copyright field by
identifying three categories of potentially positive effects of fair use: 1)
network dynamics, 2) complementary goods and services, and 3) long-term
enhancement of marketing opportunities. These three categories of
economic effects parallel three facets of the value of biodiversity: 1)
indirect use values like ecosystem services (which enable other productive
economic activity), 2) direct use values (which complement other forms of
economic activity), and 3) option values (which focus on the long-term
value of biodiversity).
Of course, it is never wise to analogize too directly between the law
(and valuation) of real and intellectual property. The comparisons proposed
here are cautious and tentative. But it is undeniable that a) "effect on the
market" analysis in copyright law currently does not systematically address
the positive effects of new uses, b) "effect on the market analysis" is part of
a fair use inquiry ultimately designed to assess the worth of an intellectual
commons, and c) economic studies focused on tangible commons have
refined and developed categories of value that anticipate and promise to
concretize neglected values of an informational commons. Even those
skeptical of the parallels between informational and tangible commons
resources can appreciate the need for courts to systematically inquire into
the potentially positive effects of new technologies in "effect on the market"
analysis.
producers can't be sure of customer demand. RICHARD CAVES, CREATIVE INDUSTRIES:
CONTRACTS BETWEEN ART AND COMMERCE 175 (2000).
